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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DETERMINANTS OF THE SLOPE OF S&P 500 INDEX OPTIONS: A JOINT 
ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC ANNOUNCEMENTS AND PRIVATE 
INFORMATION 
Yaşar, Burze 
Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assoc.Prof. Aslıhan Salih 
 
 
September 2014 
 
This thesis analyzes the possible determinants of the observed implied volatility skew 
of S&P 500 index options.  The thesis will also examine the high frequency changes 
in VIX in response to macroeconomic announcements. Finally the effect of 
presidential announcements on stock market volatility will be investigated. 
 
Keywords: Implied volatility skew, VIX, volatility, private information, 
macroeconomic announcements, presidential announcements 
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ÖZET 
 
 
S&P 500 ENDEKS OPSİYONLARINDAN ELDE EDİLEN ZIMNİ OYNAKLIK 
EĞRİSİNİN BELİRLEYİCİ FAKTÖRLERİ: MAKROEKONOMİK 
DUYURULARIN VE ÖZEL BİLGİNİN (VPIN) BİRLİKTE ANALİZİ 
Yaşar, Burze 
Doktora, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Aslıhan Salih 
 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
Bu tez, S&P 500 Endeks opsiyonlarından elde edilen zımni oynaklık eğrisinin 
çarpıklığının belirleyici faktörlerini analiz etmiştir. Bu çalışma ayrıca VIX Oynaklık 
Endeksinin makroekonomik duyurular ile ilişkisini yüksek frekansta incelemiştir. Son 
olarak da başkanların duyurularının hisse senedi piyasası oynaklığına etkilerini 
araştırmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Oynaklık çarpıklığı, VIX, oynaklık, özel bilgi, makroekonomik 
duyurular, başkanların duyuruları 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis examines the high frequency characteristics of S&P 500 index options’ 
implied volatility skew and VIX. Slope of implied volatility skew is a good proxy for 
jump risk and investor risk aversion. VIX is a good measure of both market risk and 
investor ‘fear gauge’. In an attempt to explain changes in these parameters proxied by 
slope and VIX, this study explores a broad range possible determinants and 
macroeconomic announcements. The last chapter covers another aspect of 
marketplace information and explores whether presidential rhetoric affects financial 
market volatility.  
 
The volatility smirk refers to the fact that for the same underlying asset, the 
implied volatilities of options with low strike prices are higher than options with high 
strike prices. This is contrary to well-known Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing 
model which predicts that the implied volatility shall be constant for every option 
which have the same maturity and are written on the same underlying asset.  
Volatility smirk in the options prices is one of the puzzling anomalies that are yet to 
be solved in the finance literature. Literature suggests that the implied volatility smirk 
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is related to investor risk aversion to negative jumps and crashes in the prices (Bates 
1991; Pan 2002). Recent literature supports that steepness of implied volatility skew 
is related to jump risk and investors require risk premiums for perceived crash risk 
(Bollerslev and Todorov, 2011; Yan, 2011; Conrad, Dittmar and Ghysels, 2013). 
 
Since the documentation of the implied volatility skew by MacBeth and 
Merville (1979) and Rubinstein (1985), academicians investigate the possible reasons 
for the skew and the option pricing implications. These models relax the constant 
volatility assumption of the Black-Scholes model and incorporate stochastic volatility, 
jumps or deterministic volatility in their option pricing models (Heston, 1993; Bates, 
1996). Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997) compare different option pricing models and 
find that stochastic volatility models with jumps outperform other models and explain 
the empirical observed volatility skew pattern or anomaly much better. 
 
The second line of researchers uses demand based arguments for option 
pricing and suggests that market participants’ supply and demand for options is an 
important determinant in the pattern of implied volatilities. The argument is based on 
limits to arbitrage theorem: Market makers cannot afford to sell an infinite number of 
contracts for a specific option series. When demand for a specific series is high, 
market makers’ portfolios become unbalanced and risky and they have to charge 
higher option prices. In this respect, excess demand (supply) for particular option 
series will cause implied volatility to increase (decrease).  Bollen and Whaley (2004) 
show that net buying pressure for each option moneyness category significantly 
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affects the shape of implied volatility function for S&P 500 index options. Gârleanu, 
Pedersen, and Poteshman's (2009) demand-based option model confirms prior results. 
They find that ATM options which have more than average implied volatility also 
have more than average demand. However, they do not provide evidence on origins of 
the buying pressure.  
 
Other papers take a different perspective and investigate possible determinants 
of implied volatility smile through cross-sectional analysis.  In this literature, the 
purpose is to understand the dynamics and determinants of the volatility skew rather 
than developing a new option pricing model. Researchers examine whether various 
firm characteristics are related to implied volatility smirk. For example, Toft and 
Prucyk (1997) explain implied volatility skews by leverage and debt covenants for 
individual equity options. They find that the higher the firm leverage, the more 
pronounced the implied volatility skews. Moreover, the options on the firms that have 
stricter debt covenants also exhibit more pronounced volatility skews. Van Buskirk 
(2011) confirms their results. He also finds a negative relation between the market-to-
book ratio and implied volatility skew. Dennis and Mayhew (2002) investigate 
whether variables such as leverage, firm size, beta, trading volume, and/or the put/call 
volume ratio explain cross-sectional variations in risk neutral skewness measure of 
Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003). Risk neutral skewness and kurtosis are closely 
related to the level and slope of implied volatility curve (Bakshi et al., 2003). 
Contrary to what Toft and Prucyk (1997) find, Dennis and Mayhew (2002) find the 
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higher the leverage the less pronounced the volatility skews. As seen from the above 
discussion the evidence related to the determinants of volatility skew is mixed. 
 
The motivation of this thesis is to provide a better frame for the determinants 
of volatility skew of S&P 500 options in a high frequency setting. A clearer 
comprehension about the factors that affect the slope is important for developing new 
option pricing models and devising proper hedging and investment strategies. In the 
first chapter, besides variables that have been shown to affect slope of implied 
volatility skew such as transaction costs and market uncertainty, we also investigate 
the effect of private information using a new metric, Volume Synchronized 
Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN) developed by Easley et al. (2012). This 
metric aims to measure order flow toxicity or adverse selection risk encountered by 
market makers in high frequency environments. We then investigate whether the 
relation between the implied volatility skews and VPIN is reinforced at 
macroeconomic announcement times. Macroeconomic announcements provide an 
avenue for investors to trade more aggressively on their private information 
(Pasquariello and Vega, 2007).   
 
The second chapter analyzes the effect of 23 macro announcements, grouped 
under categories of inflation, investment, employment, real activity and forward-
looking, on 2006 high-frequency behavior of VIX and slope of S&P 500 index 
options. Literature accepts VIX as a good proxy for future index volatility.  We aim to 
analyze the changes of VIX in response to macroeconomic announcements. We first 
analyze the effects of macroeconomic announcements on the first difference of VIX 
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and slope and then investigate whether there is asymmetric news impact. We also 
analyze the effect of surprises contained in the announcements by computing the 
difference between the announced and expected figures. 
 
 In the final chapter we investigate whether financial market volatility is 
influenced by presidential rhetoric.  We explore this hypothesis by studying over 
51,000 pages of presidential announcements over nearly 20 years of presidential 
signals about the deficit, economy and inflation/interest rates. Presidential rhetoric is 
an important research area as presidents are continuously making announcements and 
research suggests that news from a reliable source will lead to more portfolio 
rebalancing. Illeditsch (2011) argues that when investors receive information that is 
difficult to process, investors’ desire to hedge ambiguity leads to excess volatility. We 
argue that presidential rhetoric is an important and reliable source of information and 
affects market place volatility with negative and positive presidential signals leading 
to higher volatility.  
 
All of the chapters serve to our understanding of volatility and slope of 
implied volatility skew and this is a crucial aspect of risk management. In this respect, 
this thesis aims to contribute to developing pricing models and hedging strategies. 
Our results justify why traders shall closely monitor slope to understand how jump 
risk and risk aversion are evolving during a trading day. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
DETERMINANTS OF IMPLIED VOLATILITY SLOPE OF S&P 
500 OPTIONS  
 
 
Implied volatility skew refers to the pattern where implied volatilities of at-
the-money (ATM) options are lower than out-of-the-money (OTM) options. This 
empirical observation is an anomaly since the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model 
presumes that for the same underlying asset, the implied volatilities shall be constant 
in the same maturity category across different strike prices. Recent research uses 
slope of implied volatility skew as a good proxy of ex-ante crash risk (Santa Clara and 
Yan 2010, Yan 2011). This paper examines the link between this important proxy and 
several market microstructure variables using high-frequency data for S&P 500 index 
options. We find that order flow toxicity measure of Easley, de Prado and O'Hara 
(2012) is one of the important determinants of the slope of the volatility skew besides 
transactions costs, market uncertainty and net buying pressure. Understanding the 
factors affecting implied volatility skew is important for the option pricing literature. 
The findings of this study are beneficial to option traders and financial analysts who 
closely
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monitor the volatility skew as they believe that it carries important information 
regarding the market structure and the risk aversion of market participants. 
 
Alternative option pricing models attempt to account for the volatility skews 
by relaxing the distributional assumptions of the Black-Scholes model. However, 
none of the models provides a satisfactory explanation for this empirical irregularity. 
Given the limited success of these models, some researchers try to explain the 
economic determinants of the implied volatility function.  Pena, Rubio and Serna 
(1999) is the first paper in that strain of literature and argue that transaction costs are 
the main determinants of the slope of the volatility skew of the Spanish Index 
Options. They also document that time to expiration and uncertainty of the market are 
important factors. Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) suggest that past changes in 
the index level and volatility surface may be related. Other researchers propose 
demand and supply based explanations to the volatility skews. For example, Bollen 
and Whaley (2004) suggest that the implied volatility skew of index options could be 
attributed to high demand from institutional investors for puts as portfolio insurance. 
Han (2008) takes a behavioral approach and relate implied volatility smile to investor 
sentiment. Liquidity is also reported as a factor that might affect the steepness of the 
implied volatility skew with mixed findings for different options.  
 
The motivation of this study is to provide a better frame for the determinants 
of volatility skew of S&P 500 options in a high frequency setting. Besides variables 
that have shown to affect slope of implied volatility skew such as transaction costs 
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and market uncertainty, we also investigate the effect of private information using a 
new metric, Volume Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN) 
developed by Easley et al. (2012). This metric aims to measure order flow toxicity or 
adverse selection risk encountered by market makers in high frequency environments. 
VPIN is based on order imbalance and trade intensity in the market as informed 
traders are expected to trade on one side of the market and cause unbalanced volume. 
If market makers sense that order flow is toxic then they either cease or reduce their 
market making activities. In case they choose to continue to provide liquidity to the 
market, they charge higher prices for increased risk. Therefore we hypothesize that 
higher variability in slope of implied volatility skew will be observed with changes in 
VPIN level. We find that VPIN is a statistically significant factor that affects the 
shape of the volatility skews even after controlling for net buying pressure of Bollen 
and Whaley and other variables.   
 
We then investigate the relation between the implied volatility skews and 
VPIN at macroeconomic announcement times. Macroeconomic announcements 
provide an avenue for investors to trade more aggressively on their private 
information (Pasquariello and Vega, 2007).  In an earlier study, Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) document that informed traders try to time their trades at times of high level of 
trading and liquidity. 23 macro announcements are analyzed for 2006. We also 
analyze the surprises contained in these announcements by computing the difference 
between the announced and expected figures. We find that uncertainty resolution 
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affects slope at the time of macroeconomic announcements and when the surprise 
component is high. 
 
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. First, this paper analyzes 
possible determinants of slope of S&P 500 options in a high-frequency setting. 
Second, it uses a new proxy for the level of informed trading and order flow toxicity 
(VPIN) and shows that adverse selection risk significantly affects the shape of the 
volatility skews besides market uncertainty, transaction costs and net buying pressure. 
Finally, the analysis differs from standard time based approaches and documents 
high-frequency behavior of slope with respect to volume.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section one discusses 
related literature. Section two describes the data and variable construction. Section 
three presents the results of the analysis of the determinants of implied volatility 
skews. Section four concludes the paper. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model presumes that for the same 
underlying asset, the implied volatilities shall be constant in the same maturity 
category across different strike prices. MacBeth and Merville (1979) and Rubinstein 
(1985) are the first papers to document that options on the same underlying with the 
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same maturity dates have different implied volatilities across different strike prices. 
This anomaly is known as the volatility skew and takes the shape of a smile or a smirk 
depending on the instrument. Academicians investigate the possible reasons for this 
anomaly and the option pricing implications. Hull (1993) suggests that the empirical 
violations of the assumption of the normality of the log returns may cause this 
anomaly. One strand of literature has relaxed the distribution assumption of the 
Black-Scholes model (Heston, 1993; Bates, 1996), and incorporated stochastic 
volatility and jumps in option pricing models.  
 
Other researchers use demand based arguments for option pricing and suggest 
that market participants’ supply and demand for options is an important determinant 
in the pattern of implied volatilities. The argument is based on limits to arbitrage 
theorem: Market makers cannot afford to sell an infinite number of contracts for a 
specific option series. When demand for a specific series is high, market makers’ 
portfolios become unbalanced and risky and they have to charge higher option prices. 
In this respect, excess demand (supply) for particular option series will cause implied 
volatility to increase (decrease).  Bollen and Whaley (2004) show that net buying 
pressure for each option moneyness category significantly affects the shape of implied 
volatility function for S&P 500 index options1. Gârleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman's 
                                                          
1
 Bollen and Whaley (2004) note that there is considerable difference between trading volume and 
net buying pressure and these two are not necessarily highly correlated. For example trading volume 
may be high on days with significant information flow, but net buying pressure can be essentially zero 
if there are as many public orders to buy as to sell.  They suggest the underlying reason why Dennis 
and Mayhew (2002) could not find any relation between risk neutral skewness and the ratio of average 
daily put volume to average daily call volume as a measure for public order is because trading volume 
is not a precise measure for net buying pressure. Moreover aggregate option volumes do not take into 
consideration option moneyness and both deep out-of-the-money and deep in-the-money puts are 
treated the same way. 
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(2009) demand-based option model confirms prior results. They find that ATM 
options which have more than average implied volatility also have more than average 
demand.  
 
Other papers take a different perspective and investigate possible determinants 
of implied volatility smile through cross-sectional analysis.  In this literature, the 
purpose is to understand the dynamics and determinants of the volatility skew rather 
than to develop a new option pricing model. For example, Toft and Prucyk (1997) 
explain implied volatility skews by leverage and debt covenants for individual equity 
options. They find that the higher the firm leverage, the more pronounced the implied 
volatility skews. Moreover, the options on the firms that have stricter debt covenants 
also exhibit more pronounced volatility skews. Dennis and Mayhew (2002) 
investigate whether variables such as leverage, firm size, beta, trading volume, and/or 
the put/call volume ratio explain cross-sectional variations in risk neutral skewness 
measure of Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003). Risk neutral skewness and kurtosis 
are closely related to the level and slope of implied volatility curve (Bakshi et al., 
2003). Contrary to what Toft and Prucyk (1997) find, Dennis and Mayhew (2002) 
find the higher the leverage the less pronounced the volatility skews. They also 
document that larger firms with greater betas have more negative skews and firms 
with higher trading volume have more positive skews. Duan and Wei (2009) extend 
their study and argue that systematic risk is the driver for the observed pattern in 
implied volatility curve. After controlling for the overall level of total risk they find 
that for individual equity options, a steeper implied volatility curve is associated with 
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a higher amount of systematic risk. From an accounting perspective, Kim and Zhang 
(2010) show that steepness of option-implied volatility smirks in individual equity 
options is significantly and positively related to financial reporting opacity. As seen 
from the above discussion, the evidence related to the determinants of volatility skew 
is mixed. 
 
One line of literature suggests heterogeneous beliefs and investor sentiment to 
be a determining factor for the option implied volatility smile. One example is 
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) who develop an option pricing model where agents have 
heterogeneous beliefs on expected dividends. Han (2008) links implied volatility 
smile to investor sentiment. Liquidity is yet another factor that seems to affect the 
steepness of the implied volatility curve. Chou, Chung, and Hsiao (2009) report that 
the more liquid the option market, the steeper the volatility skews. Nordén and Xu 
(2012) find that options in different moneyness categories have significant differences 
in liquidity and an improvement in the liquidity of an OTM put option relative to a 
concurrent ATM call option is found to lead to lower steepness. Deuskar, Gupta, and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) find a significant link between liquidity effect and the shape of 
the volatility skews only for long maturity options written on interest rates.  
 
This study also contributes to the literature that investigates the determinants 
of jump risk. Yan (2011) argues that slope, defined as the difference between implied 
volatility of ATM puts and calls, measures the local steepness of the volatility skews 
and is a good proxy for jump risk. Understanding jump risk is important as Andersen 
Bollerslev and Diebold (2003) show that volatility estimates are more accurate when 
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jumps are differentiated. Xing, Zhang, Zhao (2010) suggest that volatility skews 
contains information related to jumps in at least three aspects: 1) the probability of a 
negative price jump 2) the expected size of the price jump 3) the jump risk premium 
that also compensates investors for the expected size of the jump. Cremers, Driessen, 
Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2008) show that volatility skews is a significant 
determinant of corporate credit spreads which are also highly sensitive to jump risk. 
Therefore, our study will also shed light on the possible determinants of the jumps in 
option prices.  
 
This paper is also related to the literature that investigates the effects of 
macroeconomic news on financial markets. Ederington and Lee (1996) are the first to 
study the impact of news on option implied volatility. Kearney and Lombra (2004) 
find a significant positive relation between the CBOE volatility index, VIX, and 
unanticipated changes in employment, but not inflation. Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2007), investigate the impact of public news on returns and 
volatility in three markets: foreign exchange, bond and equity markets using high-
frequency intraday data. They find that macro announcement surprises significantly 
affect the returns and volatilities in all three markets. Onan, Salih and Yasar (2014) 
associate high-frequency changes in VIX and slope with macroeconomic 
announcements. Different from other studies, this paper looks at the impact of VPIN 
and other potential factors on slope at macroeconomic announcement times.  
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2.2 Data and Variable Construction 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the data, volume time approach and 
the variables that we use as possible determinants of slope of implied volatility skew 
of S&P 500 Index Options.  
 
2.2.1 Data 
 
The data consists of tick-by-tick data of S&P 500 Index (SPX) option 
contracts and is obtained from Berkeley Options Database for a total of 251 trading 
days in 20062. The dataset is derived from the Market Data Report (MDR file) of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and includes time-stamped (in seconds) 
option trades and quotes (options of all strikes and maturities) including expiration 
date, put – call code, exercise price, bid and ask prices and contemporaneous price of 
the underlying S&P 500 Index. Daily S&P 500 continuous dividend yields are 
obtained from the DataStream database.  
 
Tick by tick options data is filtered based on maturity, no-arbitrage lower 
option boundaries and for obvious reporting errors and outliers. In order to avoid 
implied volatilities that are likely to be measured with error, only options with bid 
                                                          
2
 Sample data does not coincide with US financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
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prices greater than zero are used3. Put-Call parity violations are not filtered as they 
might contain evidence related to the trading activity of informed traders (Cremers 
and Weinbaum, 2010). We include options that have maturities between 15 and 45 
trading days since these are the most liquid options. This study does not include 
options that have maturities shorter than 15 days, as shorter term options have 
relatively small time premiums and are substantially unreliable when calculating 
option implied volatilities (Dumas et. al., 1998).  
 
Trading hours on the CBOE begin at 8:30 a.m. (CST) and end at 3:15 p.m. 
(CST); however, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) closes at 4:00 p.m. (EST) and 
this corresponds to 3.00 p.m. (CST). Therefore, we delete all option quotes after 3:00 
p.m. (CST) in order not to have non-synchronicity problem in our analysis. We plot 
the intraday behavior of trading activity in Figure 1. We observe that the average 
number of contracts traded and dollar volume are highest within the first trading hour. 
Average number of contracts then gradually decreases till noon and slightly increases 
towards closing.  Average volume makes a peak in the early afternoon between 12:30 
to 13:30 and towards closing around 15:00. The observed patterns could be attributed 
to the macroeconomic announcement timings at 8:30 EST and market opening effects.   
 
One of the problems of working with high frequency data is arrival of market 
ticks at random time. Regular time-series econometric tools which frequently use  
                                                          
3
 In a same manner, but a bit different approach, some authors use options with bid-ask midpoints 
higher than 0.125 or 0.25.   
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Figure 1: Intraday behavior of S&P 500 trading Figure shows the intraday 
(thirty-min) behavior of average number of contracts and average dollar volume for SPX 
thirty-day options for a total observations of 585,991 during 2006.  
 
backward operators cannot be applied to irregularly spaced or nonhomogeneous time 
series (Gencay et al., 2001). Traditional approach to this problem is to equally space 
time-series data and work with time bars. Alternative approach to working with 
nonhomogeneous data is to use volume bars. Every time a predetermined level of 
volume is traded in the market marks the separation of volume bars. In this study, we 
employ volume bars for analysis or in other words work in volume time. Easley et al. 
(2012) argue that in a high frequency framework, volume time, measured by volume 
increments, is a more relevant metric compared to clock time as trades take place in 
milliseconds. 
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Following Easley et al (2012), we group sequential trades in the so-called 
volume buckets until their combined volume equals constant size, V, which is an 
exogenously defined fixed size. In the analysis, we define V as one thirteenth of the 
average daily volume. If the size of the last trade that is needed to complete a bucket 
is greater than needed, then excess part of that trade is assigned to the next bucket. 
The time needed to fill a bucket is related to the existence of amount of information. 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggest that the time between trades is correlated with the 
presence of new information. Therefore if a very relevant piece of news arrives to the 
market, we may expect to see a lot of activity in the market and volume buckets 
filling up quickly. Hence, volume time is updated in stochastic time matching the 
arrival rate of information. Easley et al. (2012) argue that equal volume intervals 
stand for comparable amount of information.  
 
2.2.2 Variable Construction 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Slope 
 
 
We first group options in moneyness categories according to their deltas as in 
Bollen and Whaley (2004). Besides forward price of the underlying asset, an option’s 
moneyness also depends on volatility of the underlying asset and time to maturity of 
the option and delta accounts for these two factors. Table I lists the upper and lower  
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boundaries of moneyness categories. Options with absolute deltas below 0.02 or 
above 0.98 are excluded to avoid price distortions. 
 
We calculate implied volatilities of the European-style S&P 500 index options 
for each moneyness category using the extension of Black and Scholes (1973) option 
pricing formula that incorporates continuous dividends. To proxy risk-free rate, we 
calculate implied risk-free rate from put-call parity relations of options written on 
Table I 
Moneyness Category Definitions of S&P 500 Index Options 
Table presents delta upper and lower bounds of the moneyness categories of S&P 500 
Index Options.  Options with absolute deltas below 0.02 and above 0.98 are excluded. 
Option Category 
Call Option Delta 
Lower Bound 
Call Option Delta 
Upper Bound 
DITMC - Deep in the money call option 0,875  0,98 
ITMC - In the money call option 0,625  0,875 
ATMC - At the money call option 0,375  0,625 
OTMC - Out of the money call option 0,125  0,375 
DOTMC - Deep out of the money call 
option 
0,02  0,125 
   
Option Category 
Put Option Delta 
Lower Bound 
Put Option Delta 
Upper Bound 
DITMP - Deep in the money put option - 0,98  - 0,875 
ITMP - In the money put option - 0,875   - 0,625 
ATMP - At the money put option - 0,625  - 0,375 
OTMP - Out of the money put option - 0,375  - 0,125 
DOTMP - Deep out of the money put 
option 
- 0,125   - 0,02 
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S&P 500 Index. Daily SPX dividend yields obtained from the DataStream are used in 
implied volatility calculations.  
 
We first calculate implied volatility for each trade in a volume bucket, then 
average these implied volatilities for each moneyness category. We then calculate two 
measures of slope taking differences of average implied volatilities as follows:  
 
 Slope1 =                   (1) 
Slope2 =               
 
where       and        are implied volatilities of ATM and OTM puts respectively 
and        is implied volatility of ATM calls. Figure 2 graphs the average implied 
volatilities of all traded call and put options in 2006 as a function of moneyness level. 
The average of the volatility skews has a smirk shape during 2006 in line with 
previously documented patterns. As observed in the figure average implied volatility 
of put options is higher than that of call options. This is intuitive as demand for put 
options is higher and they are traded more.  
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Figure 2. Option Implied Volatilities. Figure plots the average implied volatilities of call and 
put options as a function of moneyness for the SPX Options during 2006 using high frequency data. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 Liquidity and Transaction Costs  
 
 
  
There are numerous studies on the effects of liquidity on stock market, but 
research is limited for the derivatives market. Moreover, the effect of liquidity on 
option prices is not easy to interpret as investors hold both short and long positions. In 
an option pricing model, Cetin et al. (2007) model liquidity costs as a stochastic 
supply curve with the underlying asset price depending on order flow and suggest that 
liquidity costs may be partially responsible for the implied volatility “smile”. Chou, 
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Chung, Hsiao and Wang (2011) show that liquidity affects both the level and slope of 
implied volatility curve for 30 component stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA). Specifically they find that when the option market is more liquid (lower bid-
ask spreads for options), the implied volatility curve is steeper. Deuskar, Gupta and 
Subrahmanyam (2011) use bid-ask spreads to proxy for illiquidity and find that 
illiquid interest rate options trade at higher prices relative to more liquid options in the 
over-the-counter market. Feng, Hung and Wang (2014) provide evidence supporting 
the notion that option pricing models must incorporate liquidity risks. In this respect, 
we try to control effects of liquidity in our sample by choosing short-term options 
which are most liquid. Moreover, sampling by equal volume buckets also helps us to 
control for liquidity effects since a widely used measure of liquidity in options market 
is the log of number of option contracts for an interval and volume buckets include 
same fixed number of contracts.   
 
Using daily S&P 100 Index option prices, Longstaff (1995) shows that market 
frictions such as transaction costs also play a major role on option prices besides 
market illiquidity. Pena et al (1999) find that transactions costs estimated by daily 
average relative bid-ask spread of options, significantly affect the shape of the implied 
volatility functions. Ederington and Guan (2002) also present evidence that 
transaction costs related to the construction of the delta neutral portfolio cause 
volatility smiles. As a proxy for transaction costs, for each transacted option, we 
calculate a relative bid-ask spread, namely bid-ask spread divided by an option’s mid 
quote as in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). We then calculate an average relative bid-
22 
 
ask spread for each moneyness category in a volume bucket. Relative bid-ask spread 
is also considered a good proxy for liquidity.  
 
2.2.2.3 Momentum 
 
 
 
According to market momentum hypothesis, if past returns are positive, 
investors expect future stock returns to be positive and they will tend to buy call 
options on the market index. Similarly, if past returns are negative, investors will buy 
put options. High demand for call (put) options will create an upward pressure on call 
(put) prices. Pena et al. (1999) find that market momentum is a determinant for the 
level of implied volatility function for Spanish IBEX-35 Index options. They proxy 
momentum with log of the ratio of the three-month moving average of value weighted 
IBEX to its current level. Amin, Coval and Seyhun (2004) also find that option prices 
depend on stock market momentum. They observe that when stock returns decline, 
call-smile more than doubles and put smile more than triples.  The effect is visible for 
at-the-money options but higher for out-of-the money options. They conclude that 
even though market momentum seems to affect the volatility smiles, it does not 
completely explain volatility smiles. We include momentum in our set of explanatory 
variables and calculate daily index return on a rolling window basis using thirteen 
volume buckets.   
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2.2.2.4 Time to maturity and market uncertainty 
 
 
Pena et al. (1999) find that option’s time-to-expiration and market uncertainty are 
also important variables that explain the smile of implied volatility function of 
Spanish IBEX-35 Index options. In this respect, we include time to maturity as an 
explanatory variable since volatility skew of S&P 500 Index options may also be 
changing throughout option’s life.  Option’s time to maturity is the annualized 
number of calendar days between the trade date and the expiration date. Another 
variable we include in the analysis is market uncertainty about the return of S&P 500 
Index and we proxy it with daily realized volatility which is the sum of squared five-
min returns during each day (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys, 2001). 
Alternatively we use VIX as a proxy for market uncertainty.  
 
2.2.2.5 Net Buying Pressure 
 
 
 
Bollen and Whaley (2004) define Net Buying Pressure (NBP) as the difference 
between the number of buyer-motivated contracts and the number of seller-motivated 
contracts traded and show that NBP, especially for index puts, affect shape and 
movement of implied volatility function for S&P 500 index options. They calculate 
NBP daily for each options series, multiply it by the absolute value of the option’s 
delta and standardize it with volume. In a similar fashion, we calculate NBP for each 
moneyness category in a volume bucket and include it in our analysis with other 
possible determinants of slope of implied volatility skew of S&P 500 options.  
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In order to calculate NBP, we first need to know which trades are buyer 
motivated and which trades are seller motivated. We apply widely used Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm to classify trades. According to this algorithm, transactions 
that occur at prices higher (lower) than the quote midpoint are classified as buyer-
initiated (seller-initiated). Transactions that occur at a price that equals the quote 
midpoint but is higher (lower) than the previous transaction price are classified as 
buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). Transactions that occur at a price that equals both the 
quote midpoint and the previous transaction price but is higher (lower) than the last 
different transaction price are classified as being buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). 
Table II shows the distribution of buyer and seller motivated trades in our sample. For 
transactions 53.2% are buys and 45.5% are sells. We discard unidentified trades 
which constitute 1.3% of the population.  
 
Once we have identified buyer and seller motivated trades, we calculate NBP 
using aggregate volume of all options as well as using volume of call and put option 
series separately. As defined previously, NBP is the difference between buyer 
motivated and seller motivated trades. We calculate NBP for each moneyness 
category in a volume bucket. Table III shows NBP for S&P 500 Index options in our 
filtered sample in terms of moneyness category. In line with prior evidence, put 
option trading is much higher than index call option trading. We observe that trading 
is mainly concentrated on ATM, OTM and DOTM options.  
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Table II 
Distribution of Buyer/Seller Motivated S&P 500 Index Option Trades  
Table presents the distribution of buyer/seller motivated S&P 500 Index options traded on Chicago 
Board Options Exchange in 2006 subject to filtration discussed in Data section. We use Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm to classify trades. According to this algorithm, transactions that occur at prices higher 
(lower) than the quote midpoint are classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). Transactions that occur 
at a price that equals the quote midpoint but is higher (lower) than the previous transaction price are 
classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). Transactions that occur at a price that equals both the quote 
midpoint and the previous transaction price but is higher (lower) than the last different transaction price 
are classified as being buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). We discard unidentified trades which constitute 
1.3% of the population. 
Identification Type Number of Trades Prop. of Total 
Buy 256,332 53.2% 
Sell 219,081 45.5% 
Unidentified 6,317 1.3% 
Total 481,730 100.0% 
 
Table III 
Summary of Net Buying Pressure for S&P 500 Index Options  
Table presents the distribution of buyer/seller motivated S&P 500 Index options traded on Chicago 
Board Options Exchange in 2006 subject to filtration discussed in Data section according to moneyness 
categories. Moneyness category definitions are as in Table I. Net is the difference between buyer and 
seller motivated trades.  
 
Category Buy Sell Net Total 
Prop. of 
Total (%) 
CALLS 
DITMC 195,785 114,15 81,635 309,935 0.7 
ITMC 543,831 543,418 413 1,087,249 2.5 
ATMC 2,446,186 2,249,534 196,652 4,695,720 10.9 
OTMC 2,010,184 1,632,883 377,301 3,643,067 8.5 
DOTMC 2,576,943 2,593,281 -16,338 5,170,224 12.0 
TOTAL 7,772,929 7,133,266 639,663 14,906,195 34.7 
       
PUTS 
DITMP 48,866 15,012 33,854 63,878 0.1 
ITMP 167,299 213,136 -45,837 380,435 0.9 
ATMP 2,383,708 2,229,217 154,491 4,612,925 10.7 
OTMP 3,899,926 3,492,139 407,787 7,392,065 17.2 
DOTMP 7,782,305 7,810,069 -27,764 15,592,374 36.3 
TOTAL 14,282,104 13,759,573 522,531 28,041,677 65.3 
       
ALL 
 
22,055,033 20,892,839 1,162,194 42,947,872 100.0 
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. 
2.2.2.6 Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN)  
 
 
We further investigate the role of demand and supply for different option 
series on slope of implied volatility skew. Since level of private information and 
adverse selection risk are key factors for market makers’ portfolio rebalancing and  
supply, a metric that measures these may be an important determinant of implied 
volatility skew We use a new metric, VPIN, introduced by Easley et al (2012), to 
assess the level of informed trading and adverse selection risk of market makers. 
Informed trading for index options may arise if investors learn anything related to the 
macroeconomic announcements before the release time. Private information may also 
arise from heterogeneous interpretations of public information (Green, 2004). 
Investors who are credited with superior analytical skills or who are using superior 
models are likely to better process information. Private information for stock index 
options arises, because, even though everybody sees the same set of public news, their 
interpretation of the news may differ. A public news event can cause buy and sell 
decisions at the same time if investors use different models and disagree about the 
interpretation of the news. Kandel and Pearson (1995) also provide empirical 
evidence against the assumption that agents interpret public information identically. 
 
VPIN measures the level of informed trading or the so-called order flow 
toxicity based on order imbalance and trade intensity in the market.  Toxicity refers to 
the adverse selection risk of market makers and uninformed investors or risk of loss in 
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trading with better informed parties. Informed traders are expected to trade on one 
side of the market and cause unbalanced volume. If market makers sense that order 
flow is toxic then they either cease or reduce their market making activities. In case 
they choose to continue to provide liquidity to the market, they charge higher prices 
for increased risk. Therefore, we hypothesize that there will be higher variability in 
prices and movement in slope, associated with increases in VPIN.  
VPIN is based on the imbalance between buy and sell orders for each volume 
bucket during a sample window for all traded options. If we let  = 1, … n be the 
index of equal volume buckets, then a VPIN value for each volume bucket is 
calculated as follows: 
     
∑ |  
    
 |    
  
   (2) 
where V is the constant bucket size and equal to 1/13
th
 of the average daily volume in 
our sample    are the equal volume buckets for         per day,   
  is the volume 
classified as sell,   
  is the volume classified as buy, and ‘n’ is length of the sample 
window or the number of buckets used to approximate the expected trade imbalance 
and intensity. VPIN is estimated on a rolling basis. This rolling calculation makes 
VPIN highly auto correlated but dropping buckets along the calculation avoids long 
memory in the process. If we let rolling window sample size n to be 5, then when 
sixth bucket is filled, bucket one is dropped and the new VPIN metric is calculated 
based on bucket two through six. VPIN value of the 6th bucket is independent from 
the VPIN value of the first bucket. If we let n to be 13, then this is equivalent to 
calculating a daily VPIN. Since we are working with high frequency data we want 
VPIN metric to be updated intraday and we use n as 5. We have an average of 13 
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VPIN values per day but on very active days the VPIN metric is updated much more 
frequently than on less active days.  
 
VPIN has two advantages compared to PIN measure (Easley, Kiefer, O'hara 
and Paperman, 1996) which has been widely used in the literature as a proxy for the 
level of informed trading in markets. First, we do not have to estimate unobserved 
parameters for VPIN. Second, there are also criticisms against PIN for being a proxy 
for only illiquidity effects and not asymmetric information. (Duarte and Young, 
2009; Akay, Cyree, Griffiths, and Winters, 2012). VPIN is less prone to infrequent 
trading since equal volume buckets are used. Table IV presents the summary 
statistics for our variables in volume time. Average VPIN is 0.38 with a maximum of 
1 and a minimum of 0.04. Average implied volatility is 10% for calls and 17% for 
puts. Average VIX is 13.09% annually. 
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
 
The objective of this section is to explore the linkage between the variables 
discussed in the prior section and changes in slope of implied volatility skew of S&P 
500 options. We start the analysis by conducting the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
stationarity tests on our variables. We are able to reject the existence of a unit root for 
all of our variables and first difference of VIX. Observation of the ACF reveals that 
change in slope is highly auto-correlated and we include first lag of slope as an 
independent variable in the regression.  
29 
 
 
 
 
  
Table IV 
Summary Statistics 
Table lists the summary statistics for our variables. VPIN is the order flow toxicity metric calculated as 
in Equation (3). Calls NBP (Puts NBP) is the net buying pressure calculated as the difference between 
buyer motivated and seller motivated trades times the absolute value of delta for calls (puts). Calls 
Imp. Volatility (Puts Imp. Volatility) is the average of implied volatilities for calls (puts). Calls Spread 
(Puts Spread) is the relative bid-ask spread, namely bid-ask spread divided by an option’s mid quote 
for calls (puts). Slope is one of the three measures of slope defined in Equation (1). Index is index 
level. Index Return is the index return computed from volume bar n-13 to n-1. Real. Volatility is 
realized volatility which is the sum of squared five-min returns during each day. VIX is the CBOE’s 
volatility index for the S&P 500 index return.  
 
Variable Name Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
VPIN 0.04 0.34 1.00 0.38 0.19 0.80 3.21 
Calls NBP -5678.46 15.17 16311.92 81.25 1201.35 2.01 26.36 
Calls Imp. Volatility 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.93 3.51 
Calls Spread 0.03 0.15 1.43 0.17 0.09 3.97 34.09 
Puts NBP -32395.32 45.15 6989.40 45.71 1224.09 -9.22 230.07 
Puts Imp. Volatility 0.09 0.13 0.27 0.14 0.03 1.06 3.69 
Puts Spread 0.04 0.13 0.68 0.14 0.06 3.02 16.45 
ATM Calls NBP -4128.43 0.54 9320.21 26.62 685.71 0.99 19.47 
ATM Calls Spread 0.01 0.07 0.32 0.07 0.02 1.69 12.86 
ATM Puts NBP -32396.52 1.22 4725.65 16.15 998.57 -17.22 517.47 
ATM Puts Spread 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.92 6.92 
OTM Puts NBP -3088.33 2.46 3232.77 35.80 478.48 0.16 9.20 
OTM Puts Spread 0.02 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.03 1.09 7.10 
DOTM Puts NBP -2164.55 0.00 2373.45 -5.13 253.32 -0.42 14.36 
DOTM Puts Spread 0.03 0.22 1.06 0.23 0.09 2.08 10.96 
Slope1 -0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 -2.11 26.78 
Slope2 -0.05 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.87 5.43 
Index  1219.73 1295.20 1431.59 1308.75 52.32 0.82 2.56 
Index Return -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.09 4.71 
Real. Volatility 0.00 0.08 0.43 0.09 0.05 2.75 13.41 
VIX 9.44 12.07 22.99 13.09 2.58 1.10 3.63 
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To assess the relation between slope and variables discussed above, we 
estimate the following regression with Newey-West corrected standard errors: 
 
                                                      
                     (3) 
 
where ΔSlopen is change in one of the three measures of slope defined in Equation (1) 
from volume bar n-1 to n. Rn is the index return computed from volume bar n-13 to n-
1 for the momentum effect. Timen is option’s annualized time to maturity. Spreadn is 
the relative bid-ask spread, namely bid-ask spread divided by an option’s mid quote 
and is calculated for calls and puts separately for each moneyness category. RVn  is 
realized volatility which is the sum of squared five-min returns during each day. NBPn 
is the net buying pressure calculated as the difference between buyer motivated and 
seller motivated trades times the absolute value of delta for each moneyness category 
of calls and puts separately. NBP variables vary in different regressions depending on 
the slope measure. VPINn is the metric for probability of informed trading and 
calculated as in Equation (2). 
 
Table V displays the results of regression in Equation (3) and show that all of 
our variables except momentum seem to contribute to the variability of slope of 
implied volatility skew of S&P 500 Index Options. Pena et al. finds a weak relation 
between market momentum and degree of curvature of the smile and in our analysis 
the effect of momentum on slope is not significant. In line with Pena et al.’s findings 
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for Spanish Index options we find that change in slope of S&P 500 Index options is 
related to transactions costs represented by bid-ask spreads, time to expiration of the 
options and volatility of the index. The lagged change in slope is negatively and 
significantly related to current change in both measures of slope. This is in line with 
limits to arbitrage theorem which suggests that as market makers rebalance their 
portfolios, prices reverse to their previous levels gradually.  
 
In line with Bollen and Whaley (2004), NBP of options significantly affect 
slope. Both measures of slope, the coefficient of NBP of ATM calls is significant and 
negative. NBP of ATM (OTM) puts is significantly and positively related to Slope1 
(Slope2). Besides these variables, we find a significant relation between VPIN and 
slope. The relation is positive for both measures of slope. This implies that the higher 
the level of private information and order flow toxicity in the market the more 
asymmetrically the OTM and ATM puts are valued in the market relative to ATM 
calls.  
 
Informed traders try to time their trades at times of high level of trading and 
liquidity and macroeconomic announcements provide an avenue for investors to trade 
more aggressively on their private information. If VPIN captures the probability of 
informed trading well, then it would be interesting to see the relation between VPIN 
and slope at macroeconomic announcement times. The macroeconomic 
announcement 
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Table V 
Determinants of Slope of S&P 500 Index Options Skew 
Table presents the regression results of                                     
                                      where ΔSlopen is change in one of the two 
measures of slope defined in Equation (1) from volume bar n-1 to n. Rn is the index return computed 
from volume bar n-13 to n-1for the momentum effect. Spreadn is the relative bid-ask spread, namely 
bid-ask spread divided by an option’s mid quote and RVn  is realized volatility which is the sum of 
squared five-min returns during each day. Timen is option’s annualized time to maturity. NBPn is the net 
buying pressure calculated as the difference between buyer motivated and seller motivated trades times 
the absolute value of delta for each moneyness category. VPINn is the metric for probability of 
informed trading and calculated as in Equation (2). ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Δ Slope1 
 
Δ Slope2  
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Intercept -0.003 -3.334 *** -0.006 -5.751 *** 
Δslopen-1 -0.346 
-
20.466 *** -0.379 -22.569 *** 
R 0.025 1.465 
 
0.002 0.091  
Time 0.005 0.915 
 
0.016 2.513 ** 
Atm Call Spread 0.004 0.888 
 
-0.007 -1.118  
Atm Put Spread 0.016 2.860 *** 
  
 
Otm Put  Spread 
   
0.040 8.927 *** 
RV 0.004 1.900 * 0.002 0.617  
Atm Call NBP -0.014 -7.476 *** -0.010 -4.442 *** 
Atm Put NBP 0.015 7.787 *** 
  
 
Otm Put NBP 
   
0.014 4.205 *** 
VPIN 0.001 2.575 *** 0.002 2.438 ** 
 
 
timings, realizations and survey expectations are obtained from Bloomberg. Most of 
the announcements are monthly but initial jobless claims announcement is weekly and 
we also have a number of quarterly announcements. Table VI lists the 
macroeconomic announcements that we include in our analysis. We include 23 
macroeconomic announcements and most of the announcements are monthly but 
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initial jobless claims announcement is weekly and we also have a number of quarterly 
announcements.  
 
We first visually examine behavior of slope and VPIN around macroeconomic 
announcements.  We calculate the averages of slope and VPIN for each volume bar 
corresponding to the announcement time t, and up to 15 pre-announcement and post-
announcement volume bars from January through December in 2006. Figures 3 and 4 
plot the averages. Figure 3 shows that Slope2 drops sharply in response to an 
announcement release but drop is not that significant Slope1. In Figure 4, we observe 
that VPIN calculated over a window size of 5, starts to decrease 5 volume bars before 
the announcement and increases afterwards. Before the announcement, we observe a 
tranquil period for informed traders in options market, which could be due to 
investors’ tendency to wait for the releases and postpone their trades. Informed 
trading activity increases within nine volume bars following an announcement. As 
most of the announcements coincide with market opening, it is difficult to anticipate 
the response time of the informed traders to the announcement release, nine volume 
bars might correspond to a very short period of response time.  
 
We continue our analysis with adding one more variable to the regression 
equation (3) to test the relation between VPIN and implied volatility skew at 
macroeconomic announcements times. We observe that for Slope2 the impact of News 
dummy is stronger than the impact of VPIN. When there is a macroeconomic 
announcement with information resolution there is a decrease in Slope2. 
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Table VI 
Macroeconomic Announcements 
Table lists the macroeconomic announcements used in this study along with the category, timing in 
EST, source, frequency. Abbreviations are Investors Business Daily (IBD), Automatic Data 
Processing (ADP), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of the Census (BC), Conference Board (CB), US. Department of 
Labor (UDL), Institute for Supply Management (ISM), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(FRBP) and National Association of Realtors (NAR).  
 
Macroeconomic Announcement Time Source Frequency   
ADP Employment Change 8:15 ADP Five times   
Unemployment Rate 8:30 BLS Monthly   
Initial Jobless Claims 8:30 UDL Weekly   
Consumer Price Index  8:30 BLS Monthly   
Unit Labor Costs 8:30 BLS Eight times   
GDP Price Index 8:30 BEA Monthly   
Producer Price Index  8:30 BLS Monthly   
Chicago Purchasing Manager 10:00 ISM Monthly   
Consumer Confidence 10:00 CB Monthly   
IBD/TIPP Economic Optimism 10:00 IBD Six times   
Philadelphia Fed. 12:00 FRBP Monthly   
Index of Leading Indicators 10:00 CB Monthly   
Housing Starts 8:30 BC Monthly   
Durable Goods Orders* 8:30 BC Monthly   
Factory Orders 10:00 BC Monthly   
Construction Spending 10:00 BC Monthly   
Business Inventories 10:00 BC Monthly   
Wholesale Inventories 10:00 BC Monthly   
Personal Income/Spending 8:30 BEA Monthly   
Retail Sales Less Autos 8:30 BC Monthly   
Capacity Utilization/Industrial Production 9:15 FRB Monthly   
Existing Home Sales 8:30 NAR Monthly   
New Home Sales 10:00 BC Monthly   
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
*When there is also a GDP announcement that day, the durable goods orders announcement is made at 10:00 
AM 
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Figure 3. Behavior of Slope at Announcements in Volume Time. Figure 
plots the average of slope for each volume bucket corresponding to the announcement time 
t during 2006. Pre-announcement and post-announcement means of slope are also included 
up to 15 volume buckets. 
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Figure 4. Behavior of VPIN at Announcements in Volume Time. 
Figure plots average of VPINs for each volume bucket corresponding to the 
announcement time t during 2006. Pre-announcement and post-announcement means of 
VPIN are also included up to 15 volume buckets. Length of the sample window that 
VPIN is updated on a rolling basis is 5.  
 
 
We also look into the surprise component of the announcement and analyze 
whether there is a stronger impact on slope when the surprise is bigger. The surprise 
component is defined as the difference between the announced figure and survey 
expectations. Surprises are assumed to be stochastic since they are related to the 
incorrect anticipation by the market participants. To allow for meaningful 
comparisons of coefficients across different announcements, we standardize news by 
the standard deviation of the surprise component for different announcements as in 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003, 2007). The standardized news for 
announcement  
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Table VII 
VPIN and Slope at Macroeconomic Announcement Times 
Table presents the regression results of                                     
                                                                    where 
ΔSlopen is change in one of the two measures of slope defined in Equation (1) from volume bar n-1 to 
n. Rn is the index return computed from volume bar n-13 to n-1for the momentum effect. Spreadn is the 
relative bid-ask spread, namely bid-ask spread divided by an option’s mid quote and RVn  is realized 
volatility which is the sum of squared five-min returns during each day. Timen is option’s annualized 
time to maturity. NBPn is the net buying pressure calculated as the difference between buyer motivated 
and seller motivated trades times the absolute value of delta for each moneyness category. VPINn is the 
metric for probability of informed trading and calculated as in Equation (2). Newsn is a dummy variable 
that takes one for the volume bucket n that includes a macroeconomic announcement and zero 
otherwise ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Δ Slope1 
 
Δ Slope2 
 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 Intercept -0.003 -3.223 *** -0.006 -5.515 *** 
Δslopen-1 -0.345 -20.414 *** -0.379 -22.597 *** 
R 0.025 1.485 
 
0.004 0.167 
 Time 0.005 0.908 
 
0.016 2.510 ** 
Atm Call 
Spread 0.005 0.897 
 
-0.007 -1.113 
 Atm Put Spread 0.016 2.872 *** 
   Otm Put  Spread 
  
0.040 9.053 *** 
RV 0.004 1.897 * 0.001 0.588 
 Atm Call NBP -0.014 -7.476 *** -0.010 -4.444 *** 
Atm Put NBP 0.015 7.789 *** 
   Otm Put NBP 
  
0.014 4.273 *** 
VPIN 0.001 2.290 ** 0.001 1.745 * 
News -0.001 -0.677 
 
-0.003 -2.268 ** 
News*VPIN 0.000 0.138 
 
0.004 1.145 
  
 
k at time t, Surprisek,t, is defined as follows: 
              
                         
 ̂ 
   (4) 
where Actualk,t refers to the announced value and Expectationk,t refers to the market’s 
expectation, for macro fundamental k at time t.  ̂  refers to the sample standard 
deviation of the surprise component, the difference between Actualk,t and 
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Expectationk,t  is constant for any macro fundamental k.  Table VIII reports the results 
of the regression equation 3 with an interaction term of Surprisek,t with VPINn . We 
see that the effect of macroeconomic surprise dominates and the interaction term is 
insignificant for Slope2.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
This paper examines the high frequency characteristics of S&P 500 index 
options’ implied volatility skew. Slope of implied volatility skew is a good proxy for 
jump risk and investor risk aversion. In an attempt to explain changes in implied 
volatility skew, we examine a range of microstructure variables including the level of 
order flow toxicity in the market using VPIN metric. Our analysis is carried out in 
equal volume bars that match the arrival rate of information to the market. Results 
document a statistically significant relation between slope and order flow toxicity 
even after controlling for liquidity, volatility and momentum effects, transaction costs 
and net buying pressure. In this respect, option pricing models may benefit from 
incorporating a measure of market makers’ adverse selection risk.  
 
We further analyze the relation between VPIN and slope at macroeconomic 
announcement times. Informed traders try to time their trades at times of high level of 
trading and liquidity and macroeconomic announcements provide an avenue for 
investors to trade more aggressively on their private information. We find that  
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Table VIII 
VPIN and Slope with Macroeconomic Announcement Surprises 
Table presents the regression results of                                     
                                                                            
where ΔSlopen is change in both measures of slope defined in Equation (1) from volume bar n-1 to n. 
Rn is the index return computed from volume bar n-13 to n-1for the momentum effect. Spreadn is the 
relative bid-ask spread, namely bid-ask spread divided by an option’s mid quote and RVn  is realized 
volatility which is the sum of squared five-min returns during each day. Timen is option’s annualized 
time to maturity. NBPn is the net buying pressure calculated as the difference between buyer motivated 
and seller motivated trades times the absolute value of delta standardized by volume for each 
moneyness category. VPINn is the metric for probability of informed trading and calculated as in 
Equation (2).             is defined as in Equation (4). ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Δ Slope1 
 
Δ Slope2 
 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 Intercept -0.003 -3.190 *** -0.006 -5.573 *** 
Δslopen-1 -0.345 -20.348 *** -0.379 -22.487 *** 
R 0.028 1.630 
 
0.004 0.175 
 Time 0.005 0.914 
 
0.017 2.538 ** 
Atm Call Spread 0.005 0.942 
 
-0.007 -1.057 
 Atm Put Spread 0.016 2.902 *** 
   Otm Put  Spread 
  
0.040 9.067 *** 
RV 0.003 1.777 * 0.001 0.455 
 Atm Call NBP -0.014 -7.355 *** -0.011 -4.566 *** 
Atm Put NBP 0.015 7.800 *** 
   Otm Put NBP 
   
0.014 4.146 *** 
VPIN 0.001 2.201 ** 0.001 1.855 * 
Surprise -0.001 -1.562 
 
-0.002 -2.467 ** 
Surprise*VPIN 0.001 0.687 
 
0.003 1.297 
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that the effects of uncertainty resolution and decrease in information asymmetry  
effects are dominant when there is a macroeconomic announcement and when the 
surprise component of the announcement is higher.  
 
 A clearer comprehension about the factors that affect the slope is important for 
developing new option pricing models and devising proper hedging and investment 
strategies. Our results justify why traders shall closely monitor slope to understand 
how jump risk and risk aversion are evolving during a trading day.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
IMPACT OF MACROECONOMIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ON 
IMPLIED VOLATILITY SLOPE OF SPX OPTIONS AND VIX  
 
 
The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model presumes that for the same 
underlying asset, the implied volatilities shall be constant in the same maturity 
category across different strike prices. However, empirical literature documents that 
options on the same underlying with the same maturity dates have different implied 
volatilities across different strike prices. This anomaly is known as the volatility skew 
and takes the shape of a smile or a smirk depending on the instrument. Option traders 
and financial analysts closely monitor the volatility skew as they believe that it carries 
important information regarding the market structure and the risk aversion of the 
participants in the market. This paper examines the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on the observed implied volatility skew of S&P 500 index options and 
VIX in a high-frequency setting. 
 
There have been various studies that investigate the effects of macroeconomic 
news on financial markets but not in the context of implied volatility skew. 
Ederington and Lee (1996) are the first to study the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on option implied volatility of T-bonds and foreign exchange.  
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Kearney and Lombra (2004) find a significant positive relation between the CBOE 
volatility index VIX, and unanticipated changes in employment, but not inflation. 
Baba and Sakurai (2011) investigate whether macroeconomic variables are leading 
indicators of regime shifts in the VIX and find that term spreads predict the shift from 
tranquil to the turmoil regime. Füss et al. (2011) focus only on Gross Domestic 
Product, Producer Price Index and Consumer Price Index announcements and find 
that VIX drops on announcement days. This study covers a larger range of 
macroeconomic announcements and is able to observe the intraday behavior of VIX.   
 
A related strand of literature investigates the effects of monetary policy on 
stock returns and volatility. Chen and Clements (2007) and Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) 
investigate the behavior of VIX around US monetary policy announcements and find 
that implied volatility generally decreases after FOMC meetings. Gospodinov and 
Jamali (2012) conduct a monthly analysis of the relation between Federal funds rate 
surprises and implied volatility and volatility risk premium controlling for non-farm 
payroll employment, consumer price inflation and industrial production 
announcements.  They find that surprises in Fed funds rates and both inflation and 
industrial growth affect VIX significantly in monthly regressions. Rosa (2011) 
investigates the effects of Fed’s monetary surprises on US stock and volatility indices 
in a high frequency setting. He finds that the surprise change to the current target 
federal funds rate significantly affects all indices and the surprise component of Fed’s 
statements affect all but VIX.  
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This study analyzes the effect of 23 macro announcements, grouped under 
categories of inflation, investment, employment, real activity and forward-looking, on 
2006 high-frequency behavior of VIX and slope of S&P 500 index options. We also 
analyze the surprises contained in the announcements by computing the difference 
between the announced and expected figures. We find that macroeconomic 
announcement impact is statistically significant on VIX for almost every 
announcement category and at a lesser extent on slope. To study the asymmetric 
volatility we further categorize information contained in macroeconomic 
announcements as good or bad. We find evidence that good and bad announcements 
asymmetrically affect slope of implied volatility smirk of S&P 500 Index options and 
VIX. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section one describes the 
data and variable construction. Section two presents the results of the analysis of the 
effects of macro announcements on implied volatility skews and VIX. Section three 
concludes. 
 
3.1 Data filtering and analysis 
 
 
 The data consists of tick-by-tick data of S&P 500 Index (SPX) option 
contracts and is obtained from Berkeley Options Database for a total of 250 trading 
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days in 20064. The dataset is derived from the Market Data Report (MDR file) of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and includes time-stamped (in seconds) 
option trades and quotes (options of all strikes and maturities) including expiration 
date, put – call code, exercise price, bid and ask prices and contemporaneous price of 
the underlying S&P 500 Index. Daily SPX dividend yields and U.S. T-Bill Secondary 
Market Rates are obtained from the DataStream database. For implied volatility 
calculations, we use 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, and 1-year nominal U.S. T-Bill 
Secondary Market Rates and apply cubic spline polynomial interpolation to match 
maturity dates of options.  
 
Tick by tick options data is filtered based on maturity, no-arbitrage lower 
option boundaries and for obvious reporting errors and outliers. In order to avoid 
implied volatilities that are likely to be measured with error, only options with bid 
prices greater than zero are used5. Put-Call parity violations are not filtered as they 
might contain evidence related to the trading activity of informed traders (Cremers 
and Weinbaum, 2010). We include options that have maturities between 15 and 45 
trading days since these are the most liquid options. This study does not include 
options that have maturities shorter than 15 days, as shorter term options have 
relatively small time premiums and are substantially unreliable when calculating 
option implied volatilities (Dumas et. al., 1998). 
 
                                                          
4
 Sample data does not coincide with US financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
5
 In a same manner, but a bit different approach, some authors use options with bid-ask midpoints 
higher than 0.125 or 0.25.   
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The macroeconomic announcement timings, realizations and survey 
expectations are obtained from Bloomberg. Most of the announcements are monthly 
but initial jobless claims announcement is weekly and we also have a number of 
quarterly announcements. We group macroeconomic announcements under five 
categories: inflation, investment, employment, real activity and forward-looking.  
 
Macroeconomic announcements are also categorized as good and bad news 
according to their surprise component as in Bauwens, Omrane, and Giot (2005). For a 
macroeconomic figure, if the realized value is higher than the expected value in 
surveys and stimulates economic growth then the news is classified as good. If the 
news implies economic slowdown then it is classified as bad. If the figure is an 
inflation related news and the actual is higher than expected then the news is 
classified as bad news. Table I provides the frequency, source, timing and 
categorization for the list of macroeconomic announcements. 
 
The surprise component is defined as the difference between the announced 
figure and survey expectations. Surprises are assumed to be stochastic since they are 
related to the incorrect anticipation by the market participants. To allow for 
meaningful comparisons of coefficients across different news categories, we 
standardize news by the standard deviation of the surprise component for different 
announcements as in Andersen et al. (2007). The standardized news for 
announcement k at time t, Sk,t, is defined as follows: 
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Table I 
Macroeconomic Announcements 
Table lists the macroeconomic announcements used in this study along with the category, timing in 
EST, source, frequency. We separate good and bad announcements by comparing realized and 
expected numbers. If the realized value is higher than the expected value in surveys and stimulates 
economic growth then the news is classified as good. If the news implies economic slowdown or higher 
inflation then it is classified as bad. Abbreviations are Investors Business Daily (IBD), Automatic Data 
Processing (ADP), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of the Census (BC), Conference Board (CB), US. Department of 
Labor (UDL), Institute for Supply Management (ISM), Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRBP) 
and National Association of Realtors (NAR).  
Macroeconomic Announcement Time Source Frequency Good Bad 
Employment 
     ADP Employment Change 8:15 ADP Five times - + 
Unemployment Rate 8:30 BLS Monthly - + 
Initial Jobless Claims 8:30 UDL Weekly - + 
Inflation 
     Consumer Price Index  8:30 BLS Monthly - + 
Unit Labor Costs 8:30 BLS Eight times - + 
GDP Price Index 8:30 BEA Monthly - + 
Producer Price Index  8:30 BLS Monthly - + 
Forward-looking 
     Chicago Purchasing Manager 10:00 ISM Monthly + - 
Consumer Confidence 10:00 CB Monthly + - 
IBD/TIPP Economic Optimism 10:00 IBD Six times + - 
Philadelphia Fed. 12:00 FRBP Monthly + - 
Index of Leading Indicators 10:00 CB Monthly + - 
Housing Starts 8:30 BC Monthly + - 
Investment 
     Durable Goods Orders* 8:30 BC Monthly + - 
Factory Orders 10:00 BC Monthly + - 
Construction Spending 10:00 BC Monthly + - 
Business Inventories 10:00 BC Monthly - + 
Wholesale Inventories 10:00 BC Monthly - + 
Real Activity 
     Personal Income/Spending 8:30 BEA Monthly + - 
Retail Sales Less Autos 8:30 BC Monthly + - 
Capacity Utilization/Industrial Production 9:15 FRB Monthly + - 
Other 
     Existing Home Sales 8:30 NAR Monthly + - 
New Home Sales 10:00 BC Monthly + - 
 
*When there is also a GDP announcement that day, the durable goods orders announcement is made at 10:00 AM. 
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 ̂ 
   (1) 
  
where Actualk,t refers to the announced value and Expectationk,t refers to the market’s 
expectation, for macro fundamental k at time t.  ̂  refers to the sample standard 
deviation of the surprise component, the difference between Actualk,t and 
Expectationk,t  is constant for any macro fundamental k. 
 
 One of the problems of working with high frequency data is arrival of market 
ticks at random time.  Regular time-series econometric tools which frequently use 
backward operators cannot be applied to irregularly spaced or inhomogeneous time 
series (Gencay et al., 2001). Traditional approach to this problem is to equally space 
time-series data and work with time bars. In order to homogenize time series data, 
high-frequency finance literature uses interpolation and aggregation. Aït-Sahalia, 
Mykland and Zhang (2005) note that sampling too frequently may not be optimal in 
the presence of market microstructure noise. Moreover, our trade data is not as 
frequent as quote data. Therefore, we choose subsampling frequency as thirty-min 
intervals.  
 
Implied volatility calculations are conducted using Black and Scholes option 
pricing formula. We first calculate implied volatilities for the European-style S&P 
500 index options for each moneyness category. Options are grouped in moneyness 
categories according to their deltas. A call option with           is treated as an 
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ATM call option. Similarly, a put option with           is treated as an ATM put 
option. Although these options are not exactly ATM, they are very close to being 
ATM (Yan, 2011).  
  
The slope measure is defined as the difference between ATM puts and calls as in Yan 
(2011):   
 S   ν
   
   
(-0.5) – ν
   
    
 (0.5)  (2) 
 
Where implied volatilities of put and call options with deltas equal to      and       
are denoted as  
   
    
        and ν
   
   
       respectively. We standardize slope by 
dividing it to daily realized volatility to control for the fluctuations in slope related to 
the level of volatility.  
 
3.1.1 Momentum and Liquidity Effects 
 
According to market momentum hypothesis if past returns are positive, 
investors expect future stock returns to be positive and they will tend to buy call 
options on the market index. Similarly if past returns are negative, investors will buy 
put options. High demand for call (put) options will create an upward pressure on call 
(put) prices. Amin, Coval and Seyhun (2004) do find that option prices depend on 
stock market momentum. They find that when stock returns decline, call-smile more 
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than doubles and put smile more than triples.  The effect is visible for at the money 
options but higher for out of the money options. They conclude that even though 
market momentum seems to affect the volatility smiles, it does not completely explain 
volatility smiles. Therefore we control for momentum or past stock return effects 
using lagged thirty-min returns. Literature also proposes liquidity as a possible 
determinant of implied volatility skew. Since we are using ATM options, liquidity is 
less of an issue in our analysis. Table II presents the summary statistics for our 
variables. Average annual implied volatility is 11.6% and VIX is 13.5%. 
 
3.2 Empirical Results 
 
The objective of the empirical analysis is to analyze whether macroeconomic 
announcements affect standardized implied volatility slope of S&P 500 options and 
VIX. We start the analysis by conducting the Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity 
tests on our variables. We are able to reject the existence of a unit root for 
Table II 
Summary Statistics 
Table lists the summary statistics for our variables. Slope is slope of implied volatility skew of SPX 
options calculated as the difference between ATM calls and puts during 2006. Std. Slope is Slope 
divided by daily realized volatility. IV is the average of ATM call and put implied volatilities. VIX 
is the CBOE’s volatility index for the S&P 500 index return.  
 
 
Slope 
Std. 
Slope 
IV VIX 
Min -0.094 -24.467 0.021 0.094 
Mean 0 0.081 0.116 0.135 
Max 0.103 22.565 0.198 0.234 
Std. Dev. 0.011 2.196 0.023 0.028 
Skewness 0.958 1.422 0.871 0.010 
Kurtosis 17.306 26.031 0.808 0.004 
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standardized slope and first difference of VIX. Observation of the ACF reveals that 
standardized slope is highly auto-correlated and decays slowly for thirty-min data. 
Therefore we test for long memory in slope using the range over standard deviation 
(R/S statistic) and GPH test. Both methods confirm that long memory exists in the 
time-series of standardized slope. In this respect, we use fractional autoregressive 
integrated moving average (FARIMA) process to model the short run dynamics and 
long range dependence in time series of standardized slope simultaneously.  
 
We first estimate the following regression to measure the response of 
standardized slope to macroeconomic announcement categories: 
                 ∑ ∑                +    (5) 
 
where Std Slopet is defined as the ratio of the difference between ATM put and call 
implied volatilities to daily realized volatility. The dependent variable is the residual 
from FARIMA model of standardized slope. We examine the intraday changes in 
standardized slope using thirty-min time intervals. For each time bar we calculate 
slope using the ATM call and put trades that are closest to the end of thirty-min time 
intervals. Rt  is the index return computed from time interval t-16 to t-1 and included 
as a control variable for the momentum effect. Dk,t is a dummy variable that takes one 
for the thirty-min interval t that includes a macroeconomic announcement that 
belongs to category k at time t and zero otherwise. Since the options market operates 
in CT, it is not open during macroeconomic announcements made at 8:30 am EST, 
Dk,t takes one for the first thirty-min interval of that day.  
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Table III displays the results of regression in Equation (5) and show that 
investment, inflation and real activity announcement categories seem to have an 
impact on the slope of implied volatility skew of S&P 500 Index Options.  Real 
activity category announcements seem to increase slope first and then cause a drop in 
slope in three and a half hours with higher statistical significance. Employment and 
forward-looking category announcements do not seem to be related to slope, with an 
exception of forward looking announcements category decreasing slope in three and a 
half hours only with 10% statistical significance.  Inflation (investment) 
announcement categories point to an increase (decrease) in risk aversion and slope. 
Index return variable positively affects standardized slope with a 1% statistical 
significant coefficient. This supports finding of Amin et al. (2004) about volatility 
spread increasing after stock market increases during the period March 1983 to 
December 1995.  
 
3.2.1 Asymmetric news effect 
 
 
 Research suggests that investors show asymmetric responses to good and bad 
news. By separating macroeconomic announcements into good and bad news, we try 
to assess the asymmetric effects on slope with the following analysis: 
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Table III 
Impact of Macroeconomic Announcement Categories on Slope 
Table presents the regression results of           =       ∑ ∑               +   where 
Std Slopet is slope of implied volatility skew of SPX options calculated as the difference 
between ATM calls and puts and standardized by daily realized volatility during 2006, Rtis the 
daily S&P 500 Index return computed on a rolling basis using the last 16 thirty-min time 
intervals. Dk,t is a dummy variable that takes one for the thirty-min interval t that includes a 
macroeconomic announcement that belongs to category k at time t and zero otherwise. 
Macroeconomic announcement categories are Employment, Forward-looking, Inflation, 
Investment and Real Activity. Newey-West correction is used in the regressions. ***, **,* 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Rn 
  
Employment 
 
Forward-looking 
 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 t 17.598 2.204 ** -0.551 -1.443 
 
-0.061 -0.170 
 t-1 
   
-0.041 -0.106 
 
-0.422 -1.177 
 t-2 
   
0.120 0.314 
 
-0.201 -0.561 
 t-3 
   
-0.295 -0.773 
 
-0.247 -0.688 
 t-4 
   
0.078 0.202 
 
-0.044 -0.123 
 t-5 
   
-0.558 -1.447 
 
0.579 1.637 
 t-6 
   
-0.058 -0.150 
 
0.051 0.144 
 t-7 
   
0.550 1.428 
 
-0.585 -1.656 * 
 
Investment 
 
Inflation 
 
Real Activity 
 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 t -0.281 -0.658 
 
-0.262 -0.565 
 
0.885 1.675 * 
t-1 0.604 1.416 
 
0.700 1.509 
 
-0.165 -0.312 
 t-2 -0.188 -0.440 
 
1.030 2.219 ** -0.725 -1.371 
 t-3 -0.512 -1.199 
 
-0.454 -0.978 
 
1.005 1.901 * 
t-4 -0.198 -0.463 
 
0.556 1.199 
 
0.094 0.177 
 t-5 0.608 1.420 
 
-0.469 -1.012 
 
0.731 1.383 
 t-6 -0.656 -1.532 ** 0.077 0.165 
 
0.425 0.804 
 t-7 1.078 2.518 
 
1.365 2.944 *** -1.237 -2.340 ** 
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          =      ∑                    ∑                  +   (6) where 
PosDummy (NegDummy) is a dummy variable that is an aggregation of all good 
(bad) announcements across all macroeconomic categories.   The impact of 
macroeconomic variables also depends on the surprise created by the announcement. 
Therefore we test for the impact of good and bad surprises by creating two separate 
variables. Taking into consideration the multicollinearity problem (news surprises 
have values at the announcement time while they are zero at other times), we sum 
standardized surprises across all different categories for good and bad 
announcements. The following regression estimates the extent to which the surprise 
component of good and bad announcements impact slope. 
          =      ∑                   ∑                 +   (7) 
 
We expect that changes in slope of implied volatility skew will vary for good 
and bad news as investor risk aversion changes with respect to the nature of the 
surprise. We hypothesize that good surprises will decrease risk aversion and slope, 
whereas bad news will have an increasing impact on both.   
 
Table IV displays the results of regression in Equations (6) and (7) and show 
that good and bad news affect the slope of implied volatility skew of S&P 500 Index 
Options differently. Table presents the results of regressing residuals from the 
FARIMA modeled standardized slope on one day return and good and bad 
announcement dummies up to two lags using thirty-min time bars. Good 
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announcement dummy decreases slope by 0.841 at 1% significance level at the 
second lag. Bad announcement dummy does not affect slope significantly. Table also 
presents the results of a similar regression on the surprise component of the 
announcements. Bad surprises increase slope statistically significantly at 5% level at 
both first and second lags. Good surprises do not seem to affect slope significantly. 
One day return is positively and statistically significantly related to slope. 
 
 
Table IV 
Impact of Good and Bad Announcements on Slope 
Table presents the results of           =      
 ∑                    ∑                  +   in the first two columns and           =  
    ∑                       ∑                     +   in the last two columns. Std Slopet is 
slope of implied volatility skew of SPX options calculated as the difference between ATM calls and 
puts and standardized by daily realized volatility during 2006, Rt is the daily S&P 500 Index return 
computed on a rolling basis using the 16 thirty-min time intervals. PosDummyt (NegDummyt) is a 
dummy variable that is an aggregation of all good (bad) macroeconomic announcements. PosSurpriset 
(NegSurpriset) is sum of standardized surprises for good (bad) announcements Newey-West correction 
is used in the regressions. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
Announcement Dummy Announcement Surprise 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
α 0.011 0.0519 
 
-0.0296 -0.5749 
 
Rt 17.7335 7.9844 ** 17.3929 2.1799 
 Good News 
      t -0.4084 0.3171 
 
0.1632 0.7732 
 t-1 -0.1435 0.3172 
 
0.048 0.2273 
 t-2 -0.8406 0.3173 *** -0.3422 -1.6217 
 Bad News 
      t -0.1002 0.3501 
 
-0.2593 -1.2266 
 t-1 0.3174 0.3501 
 
0.4547 2.151 ** 
t-2 0.5546 0.35 
 
0.4829 2.2852 ** 
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3.2.2 VIX and Macroeconomic Announcements  
 
 
Literature accepts VIX as a good proxy for future index volatility.  We aim to 
analyze the changes of VIX in response to macroeconomic announcements. We first 
analyze the effects of macroeconomic announcements on the first difference of VIX 
and then investigate whether there is asymmetric news impact.  
 
Table V presents the results of regressing first difference of VIX on 
macroeconomic announcement categories controlling for momentum effects. All the 
regressors except for real activity announcement affect VIX significantly. 
Employment, forward-looking and inflation announcements are negatively related 
with changes in VIX, pointing to a resolution of uncertainty with these 
announcements. The drop in VIX in response to inflation related news is in line with 
Füss et al. (2011). Unlike Kearney and Lombra (2004), we also find that inflation 
news affect VIX significantly. The differences in our results may stem from the fact 
that our analysis is at high frequency. Investment is positively related to VIX at 1% 
significance level suggesting an increase in uncertainty with this category of 
announcements.  
 
When we analyze Table VI that shows the effects of good and bad 
announcements on VIX separately, we see that good news decrease and negative  
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Table V 
Impact of Macroeconomic Announcements on VIX 
Table presents the results of       =        ∑ ∑               +    where the dependent 
variable is the first difference of VIX. Rt  is the daily S&P 500 Index return computed on a 
rolling basis using the last 16 thirty minute time-intervals. Dk,t is a dummy variable that takes 
one for the thirty-minute interval t that includes a macroeconomic announcement that belongs to 
category k at time t and zero otherwise. Macroeconomic announcement categories are 
Employment, Forward-looking, Inflation, Investment and Real Activity. Newey-West correction 
is used in the regressions. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
Rt 
  
Employment 
 
Forward-looking 
 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 t -2.0834 -11.0325 *** -0.0458 -2.9513 *** -0.0403 -2.5142 ** 
t-1 
   
-0.0462 -2.9603 *** 0.0178 1.1148 
 t-2 
   
-0.0019 -0.1186 
 
0.0054 0.3401 
 
          
 
Investment 
 
Inflation 
  
Real Activity 
 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 t 0.0472 2.8888 *** -0.0843 -4.2462 *** 0.0097 0.4543 
 t-1 0.0176 1.077 
 
0.0083 0.4248 
 
-0.0079 -0.3686 
 t-2 -0.0028 -0.1742 
 
-0.0214 -1.0916 
 
0.0207 0.965 
  
Table VI 
Impact of Good and Bad Announcements on VIX 
Table presents the results of the regression      =       ∑                    
∑                        and equation 12 where the dependent variable is the first difference 
of VIX. Rt  is the daily S&P 500 Index return computed on a rolling basis using the last 16 
thirty-min time intervals. Post (Negt) is a dummy variable that is an aggregation of all good (bad) 
macroeconomic announcements. Macroeconomic announcement categories are Employment, 
Forward-looking, Inflation, Investment and Real Activity. Newey-West correction is used in the 
regressions. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Announcement Dummy Announcement Surprise 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
α 0.0014 1.1084 
 
0.0014 1.1606 
 
Rt -2.0098 
-
10.4614 *** -2.0279 -10.5483 *** 
Good News 
      t -0.0734 -5.723 *** -0.0341 -3.4335 *** 
t-1 0.0095 0.7426 
 
-0.0001 -0.0119 
 t-2 -0.0032 -0.2486 
 
-0.0063 -0.6368 
 Bad News 
      t 0.032 2.7207 *** -0.0011 -0.116 
 t-1 -0.0193 -1.6398 
 
-0.0143 -1.4956 
 t-2 0.0143 1.2175 
 
0.0195 2.0464 ** 
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news increase VIX statistically significantly at 1% level in line with literature about 
asymmetric news effect on volatility.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the high frequency characteristics of S&P 500 index 
options’ implied volatility skew and VIX. Slope of implied volatility skew is a good 
proxy for jump risk and investor risk aversion. VIX is a good measure of both market 
risk and investor ‘fear gauge’. In an attempt to explain changes in these parameters 
proxied by slope and VIX, we examine a broad range of macroeconomic 
announcements. Results document a statistically significant relation between VIX and 
macroeconomic announcements even after controlling for liquidity, volatility and 
momentum effects. The effects of macroeconomic announcements on slope are more 
gradual compared to responses of VIX. We further categorize announcements into 
good and bad news to investigate whether there is any asymmetric news effect. We do 
find evidence that good and bad announcements asymmetrically change slope of 
implied volatility skew of S&P 500 Index options and VIX. 
 
 A clearer comprehension about the factors that affect the slope is important for 
developing new option pricing models and devising proper hedging and investment 
strategies. Our results justify why traders shall closely monitor slope to understand 
how jump risk and risk aversion are evolving during a trading day.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND STOCK MARKET 
VOLATILITY 
 
 
        “News from a reliable source should lead to more portfolio rebalancing than 
news from an obscure source” (Epstein and Schneider, 2008, p. 197). 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The impact of marketplace information on financial markets has been widely 
researched in finance. For example, recent literature that investigates the effects of 
macroeconomic news on financial assets’ volatility, document that foreign exchange 
bond and equity market volatility are significantly affected by macroeconomic 
announcements (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2007).  Other recent 
research associates high-frequency changes in VIX to macroeconomic announcements 
(Bailey, Zheng, and Zhou, 2012). Some other recent studies are Green (2004), Liu and 
Wright (2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Boyd, Jagannathan and Hu (2005), 
Evans and Lyons (2008) Wongswan (2009), Chen and Gau (2010), Hautsch, Hess and 
Veredas (2011), Evans (2011) and Elder, Miao and Ramchander (2012). In this paper, 
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we present evidence on an unexplored research area, the effect of United States 
presidential
rhetoric on stock market volatility.  As Presidents are commenting daily, any impact 
their statements may have on the stock market would be important from both the 
researcher’s and practitioner’s perspective.  Researchers may wish to include 
presidential announcements as a control variable when researching market volatility, 
while investors’ portfolio management may benefit from this research. 
 
The causal effect of information and its effect on the stock market has 
researchers continuing their exploration of this phenomenon.  Recent research 
suggests significant causal effects of financial journalism and aggregate market prices 
(Dougal, Engelberg, Garcia and Parsons, 2012).  The research from 1970-2007 
suggested that short term returns on the Dow Jones Industrıal Average (DJIA) can be 
predicted by focusing on an author from the Wall Street Journal.  They did not 
explore stock market volatility in regard to the WSJ information, but whether the 
DJIA had excess daily returns in regard to the financial information.  During our post-
hoc analysis, we also explored whether the impact of the presidential rhetoric would 
be different per president.  Our results agree with this research in that different 
president’s rhetoric had differing impact on market volatility.  
 
Other recent research suggests that political factors do affect the stock market.  
The research suggests that politics directly affects stock volatility as measured by 
industry-level factors (international trade exposure, sensitivity to contracts 
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enforcement, and labor intensity) with local and global country-level political 
variables (elections, autocracy, political risk, and party orientation) (Boutchkova, 
Doshi, Durnev and Molchanov, 2010).  Although there has been much research on 
stock volatility there is still great disagreement on how to model volatility forecasting 
attempting to research causal effects (e.g. Bollerslev, Litvinova and Tauchen, 2006; 
Bekaert and Wu, 2000; Schwert, 1990). 
 
Our research focuses on the president’s potential influence on financial 
markets due to his informal power to give market signals through information in his 
formal and informal talks.  Although the market information nearly always was 
available prior to the presidential rhetoric, the confirmation, denial or new perspective 
has an effect on investors as it is considered a reliable source.  The president is the 
only official who is elected by a national constituency, and as such sets the president 
apart from all other government officials and departments (ex. the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve) and gives him special authority that no one else 
has.  “The position of the president and the public’s reliance on him makes anything 
the president says important and influential” (Cohen 1995: 96).  This is directly 
related to the president’s information asymmetry6, the increased role of the U.S. 
government in monitoring and regulating the economy (Kernell 1978), and the 
president’s role as the nation’s “chief policymaker” (Brody 1991). The information 
                                                          
6
 Defined by Waterman (2003: 390) as, “the resources of intelligence that the president alone can 
acquire.  Many agencies are involved in collecting information for the presidency (NSA, CIA, 
Treasury, Commerce).  Presidents also use White House organizations (an internal resource) to acquire 
information (e.g. the Legislative Liason’s Office provides the president with information on vote 
counts in Congress).  These sources of information place presidents in a more advantageous bargaining 
position with other external political actors, both in domestic and foreign affairs.” 
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asymmetry that the president possesses is a function of information being filtered 
through the massive executive branch bureaucracy.  For an item to get on the 
president’s agenda, it must clear many obstacles to get to the White House7 (Light 
1999) which would suggest the importance of each of these items.   
 
Presidents in the United States are responsible for both the economy and 
foreign policy, which are mutually dependent, as foreign policy affects 
macroeconomics (Wood, Owens and Durham, 2005). Announcements from the 
president are not driven by only poor macroeconomic performance, as research 
suggests presidents talk steadily about the economy when conditions are both good 
and bad (Wood, 2004).  This suggests that volatility is not in response to 
macroeconomic indicators, but to the information that the President asserts.  
Presidential signals seem to have an impact as long as they have the authority to act 
on those signals, act in the short run, and have a measure of credibility in the 
workplace (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005).   
 
The assertion that presidential announcements create a market response agrees 
with previous research that the volatility of prices is directly related to the flow of 
information to the market (Ross, 1989).  Presidential communications could affect 
stock volatility as the early resolution of uncertainty helps investors to plan (Epstein 
and Turnball, 1980).  Portfolio holders show an aversion to ambiguity (payoff 
probability occurrence) (Ahn et al., 2010; Bossaerts et al., 2010) and this interaction 
                                                          
7
 Light showed that potential agenda items in the Carter administration typically passed through 13 
offices before it reached the president’s office, not even including the agencies or department that had 
to be involved. 
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between risk and ambiguity are illustrated through stock price volatility from negative 
political announcements (Bloom, 2009).  Although in agreement with the marketplace 
flow of information affecting the stock market, contrary research suggests that 
ambiguity aversion correlates with portfolio inertia and can explain sudden market 
freezes (Easley and O’Hara, 2010).  When political news is negative, investors 
maintain investment inertia as they can find risky stock allocations to hedge against 
such ambiguous news (Illeditsch, 2011).  
 
Financial asset risk and return is influenced by political uncertainty and there 
is a negative association between financial asset valuations and the level of economic 
uncertainty (Sy and Al Zaman, 2011; Ozoguz, 2009).  The uncertain information 
hypothesis, based on the core assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, suggests 
that investors are rational and are able to identify whether news is positive/negative 
but not able to ascertain the true impact (Brown, Harlow and Tinic, 1988).  As an 
example, research suggests that the prior two weeks before a political election there is 
an increase in stock prices (Pantzalis et al., 2000).  Other research focuses on the 
uncertainty of the election and finds that stock markets are affected negatively if there 
is high uncertainty (Goodell and Body, 2012).  Recent research provides support for 
the political uncertainty hypothesis (which presumes election results give information 
in regard to potential macroeconomic policies affecting business and stock prices) 
thus implying the importance of information of political nature in regard to public 
policy and stock markets (Goodell and Vahamaa, 2013). 
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Examples of politics affecting stock markets have been illustrated from both 
theoretical and empirical evidence (Fowler, 2006).  For example, the volatility index 
of the Chicago Board Option exchange increased by 17% when the U.S. House of 
Representatives voted against the Federal Reserve bailout on September 29, 2008. 
Some research has examined stock market volatility and the political environment 
(e.g. Fuss and Bechtel, 2008; Leblang and Mukherjee 2005; Bialowski, Gottschalk 
and Wisniewski, 2008), but none has examined presidential announcements and 
volatility.  As it has been noted that the President often delivers information regularly, 
the impact on the stock market is of great interest to researchers. 
 
Research into policy change announcements suggest that stock prices fall 
when a policy change is announced through general equilibrium modelling (Pastor 
and Veronesi, 2012).  Political news can be classified as positive (favorable) and 
negative (unfavorable) with favorable news decreasing uncertainty and unfavorable 
news increasing uncertainty.  According to Beaulieu, Cosset and Essaddam (2005), 
favorable news decreases stock return volatility and unfavorable political news 
increases stock return volatility.  Positive political announcements have small effects 
while negative announcements of policy changes will have larger effects due to the 
surprise element (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012). Recent research proposing a new model 
of information suggests that investors discount good news and react to bad news with 
asymmetric responses skewing the distribution of observed returns: uncertain quality 
of the news generates negative skewness while signals of known quality generate 
positive skewness (Epstein and Schneider, 2008).  Other recent research examining 
how information affects stock volatility modelled news as good or bad agaınst stock 
64 
 
volatility (Chen and Ghysels, 2010). The results of their research suggest good news 
reduces the next day’s volatility, very good news and bad news increases next day 
volatility. 
 
Our research categorizes presidential announcements as negative, positive and 
neutral utilizing tailored-made keyword filtering software applications followed by 
double blind researcher evaluations to classify announcement type. Our data is 
collected from 51,500 pages of Public Papers of the President of the United States 
covering the presidencies of Reagan, Bush and Clinton. The effect of the presidential 
signals on the volatility of the S&P 500 Index is tested using GARCH modelling and 
controlling for macroeconomic announcement dates and the recessions for the period 
of 1981 to 1999. Our results show that both positive and negative presidential signals 
have a statistically significant increasing effect on stock market volatility. The effect 
of negative presidential rhetoric is more profound compared to positive signals. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section one describes the testable 
hypothesis. Section two explains the data collection process. Section three discusses 
presidential signal categorization methodology and the choice of control variables. 
Section four presents empirical tests and results. Section five concludes. 
 
4.2 Testable Hypotheses  
 
Our primary purpose of this study is to discuss the relationship between 
presidential rhetoric and its effect on the stock market.  Marketplace information has 
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most likely already been made available to investors prior to the presidential rhetoric, 
but the president then confirms, denies, or puts their own twist on the information.  
Past research suggests that information can be positive, negative or neutral.  We test 
the following hypothesis in regard to presidential rhetoric and the stock market: 
H1:  Negative rhetoric from the president will increase volatility in S&P 500 
Composite Index. 
 
H2:  Positive rhetoric from the president will increase volatility in S&P 500 
Composite Index, but less than negative rhetoric. 
 
H3:  Neutral rhetoric from the president will decrease volatility in S&P 500 
Composite Index. 
 
 
The rationale for our hypotheses, in summary, is that the president is very 
influential and the first time he discusses marketplace information (the economy, 
inflation/interest rates, or the deficit) his input will cause investors to rebalance their 
portfolio.  As investors are risk averse, negative news should have a greater impact 
than positive news.  Neutral news (those comments which are made a second time (or 
third time, or fourth, etc.) or are of nothing that is of importance to the USA) will 
confirm to investors that no new information is forthcoming. 
 
Our research continues the stream of research on how investors react to public 
information.  For example, one recent study explores public information and its 
impact on the volume of trades of stocks and options (Cao and Ou-Yang, 2008).  The 
research suggests that stock trading and options trading react differently to public 
information.  Trading volumes of stock fluctuate based upon individual idiosyncratic 
views differing about a stock’s pay-off due to public information.  As each investor 
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sees the public information from differing viewpoints as well as a constant absolute 
risk aversion, stock purchases/sales will be different per investor as the ultimate stock 
pay-off will be viewed differently.  Investors interpret public information differently 
as investors have heterogeneous views over the same information (Kandel and 
Pearson, 1995). 
 
Research does suggest that the trading volume of stocks reacts to current 
public information.  The trading volume reaction occurs based upon four components; 
level of optimism/pessimism of public signal, its precision in regard to future perıods, 
differences of opinion about the current information, and the differences of opinion of 
all past signals (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998, Hong and Stein, 
2003).  Our research further explores a key informational element, that of presidential 
rhetoric and the investors’ reactions to his statements. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Data 
 
In this study, we are exploring whether investors respond to president’s 
signals.  Signals are pieces of information communicated to individuals – either 
intended or unintended – that allow individuals to make decisions on a variety of 
issues (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006). When the president sends signals to the market, 
signals are available to all participants in the market because the president is 
monitored by 24/7 cable news. We are analyzing what the president says formally, 
and informally, and how that message affects stock market volatility which is an 
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important variable used in many financial decisions. We hypothesize that when 
presidents make new positive or negative comments about the economy, that signal 
would create a short-term market response. The response is expected to be more 
profound following the negative signals from the president about the state of the 
economy.  To the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical work performed 
on the impact of the president’s rhetoric on financial market volatility.  There has 
been considerable work on presidential rhetoric (Tulis, 1987), and a large body of 
work by Wood (2002; 2004; 2007) and Wood, et al (2005) on the president’s 
rhetorical impact on the economy, but the impact of the president’s rhetoric on 
financial market volatility has been left unattended.    
 
4.3.1.1 Presidential Signals Data 
 
In order to properly collect, code, and analyze presidential signals as they 
relate to market responsiveness, data is used from two primary sources (Public Papers 
and Datastream) and a software application was created uniquely for this project.  For 
presidential signals, an electronic file of the Public Papers of the President of the 
United States
8
 provides the most thorough and comprehensive information including 
press conferences, Q & A sessions with reporters, radio addresses, addresses to joint 
sessions of Congress, addresses to the nation, and announcements of economic 
programs of any president. In other words, every time the president says something 
about the economy that has been recorded by the Public Papers it will be included in 
                                                          
8
 An electronic file containing the Public Papers of the Presidents was generously provided by B. Dan 
Wood from his research on presidential rhetoric and the economy (Wood, 2004; Wood, et al, 2005; 
Wood, 2007).  Dr. Wood obtained the file from the Western Standard Publishing Company (Wood, 
2007) that contained the Papers through 1999, where our analysis ends. 
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our analysis. The study covers 1981 to 1999. All prepared and unprepared statements, 
proclamations, etc., that Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton made about the 
economy, whether they are positive, negative, neutral, intended or unintended, verbal 
or written, are coded.  
 
Presidents often repeat signals and rehash speeches about the economy, 
education, and social security, to name a few issues.  The research design assumes 
that if institutional investors pay attention to what the president says, then they pay 
attention to the first signal of new information the president makes about the 
economy, not the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, etc., because they will have made their buying or selling 
decision on the first signal, not the ones the president repeats ad nausea throughout 
the day.  This is particularly true for re-election years when the president is trying to 
talk up his handling of the economy.  He may say something positive or negative at 
the beginning of the day, or at the beginning of the campaign.  That signal may create 
a market response, but the subsequent comments are assumed to be not significant and 
thus are coded as Neutral. 
 
4.3.1.2 Stock Market Data 
 
 
The second primary source of data gathering and analysis is the daily closing 
values of Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) Index downloaded from Datastream. S&P 
500 Index is a weighted combination of 500 firms chosen based on their market 
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capitalizations and represents the large cap firms. Investors use this index to track the 
broad domestic economy.  
 
4.3.2 Presidential Signal Categorization / Inter-rater Reliability 
 
 
  The software application designed uniquely for this project allows us to do 
keyword searches, as well as collate and rate the keywords.  The first tool, the RTF 
(rich-text format) document parser, reads through (parses) extremely large RTFs 
Public Papers of the President of the United States, and isolates publication year, 
publication date, the publication title (President’s Remarks at a News Conference, for 
example) and the paragraph text under that particular title.  President Reagan’s page 
count from 1981 to 1988 is 18,120, President Bush’s page count from 1989 to 1992 is 
10,512, and President Clinton’s page count from 1989 to 1999 is 22,906. The second 
tool, the natural text search engine of Oracle database technology, provides a visual 
front-end on the primary database table structure. The basic keyword search operation 
allows the user to search approximately 51,500 pages for the keywords that are of 
interest.  Documents that match are returned into a separate tree view control.  After 
parsing and categorization of texts, separately two graduate students examine each 
paragraph and identify when the president used the keywords positively, negatively, 
neutrally, or not at all (we will discuss Interrater reliability next). If the president does 
not signal new positive or negative information but merely restates his earlier news 
then that signal is coded as neutral.  The details for categorization is given in the 
following section.  
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 As Laver et al. 2003 note, the use of computer-aided analysis offers a dramatic 
increase in the amount of text that can be analyzed and automates the tediousness of 
human coding.  However, it is not a substitute for a good research design and 
computer-aided analysis does not do away with extensive human input.  For example, 
just looking at a sentence that contains the keyword Economy, may not capture that 
the President is talking about Japan’s economy and not the United States’.  Moreover, 
computer programs fail to pick up nuance in a president’s remarks and cannot handle 
words that have more than one meaning, phrases, or idioms and thus human coding is 
needed (Weber, 1990).    
 
After two raters finish coding all keyword signals, an analysis of inter-rater 
agreement
9
 is to be determined to establish reliability. Based on guidelines provided 
by Lombard, et al. (2002) for calculating and reporting inter-rater agreement, the 
following steps are taken:  First the measure of inter-rater agreement is determined, 
using the proportion of percentage agreement, defined as:   
   
  
     
    (1) 
Where    is the number of agreements and     is the number of 
disagreements.  The proportion of percentage of agreement is used because it is the 
most widely used, intuitively appealing, simple to calculate, and, “…the foundation 
upon which…measures of agreement are constructed” (Tinsley and Weiss, 2000: 
112).   
                                                          
9
 Inter-rater agreement is, “…the extent to which the different [raters] tend to assign exactly the same 
rating to each object” (Tinsley and Weiss, 2000: 98). 
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Second, a minimum acceptable level of reliability is chosen as 90% or greater, 
because that level of reliability is nearly always acceptable for proportion of 
percentage agreement (Lombard et al, 2002).  Third, a pilot test is performed of 30 
signals selected randomly by year, by month and then by keyword.  The first positive 
or negative signal in the random month, the random year, and by the random keyword 
is selected as the starting point.  This is done, so that the raters randomly select a 
neutral comment that may have appeared positive, but would not have been coded 
positive, because the president signaled that same comment earlier in the week.  A 
minimum of 30 signals after the starting point are analyzed chronologically.  After 
that selection is analyzed, another year, another month, and another keyword is 
selected at random, and so forth.  Reliability for the 30 signals is 100% for the pilot 
test.  Fourth, since the pilot test indicates that reliability levels will be adequate, 
another sample of the signals is performed.  According to Lombard et al. (2002), the 
larger sample should not be fewer than 50 and it is not necessary to examine more 
than 300.  Based on the pilot test, 400 signals are examined.   
 
In Table I, agreements between raters are displayed along the diagonal cells.  
For example, on October 22, 1998, both raters identify the signal as Positive.  That 
agreement is placed in the upper left cell, Row 1, Column 1.  Conversely, the raters 
did not agree on May 27, 1999.  Rater 1 coded the signal as Positive and Rater 2 
coded the signal as Neutral.  That disagreement is inserted in Column 1, Row 3.  The 
agreements between raters are located on each diagonal cell.  Disagreements between 
the raters are be placed in one of the off-diagonal cells.   
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The row and column totals are computed and then the total number of 
agreements are calculated, adding diagonally and then dividing the total number of 
agreements by the total number of signals selected.  In this case, 372 agreements, 
agreement divided by 400 signals, equal the proportion of percentage agreement 
again, or 93%. The 93% agreement passes the 90% threshold that was established 
beforehand.  However, as a more robust measure, Cohen’s kappa (κ) is also 
performed, indicating the proportion of agreements between two raters, adjusting for 
agreements occurring by chance (Tinsley and Brown, 2000), and is calculated as:  
 
   
     
    
    (2) 
Table I 
 
Inter-rater Agreement 
 
The agreements between Rater 1 and Rater 2 are located on each diagonal cell.  Disagreements 
between raters are located in the off-diagonal cells.  According to Lombard et al (2002) an 
acceptable level of reliability is 90% or greater.  Aggregating the diagonal cells of agreement, the 
raters agreed on 372 out of 400 signals, or 93%, exceeding Lombard’s (2002) level of reliability.     
 
 
  
Rater One 
    
 
 
P N NTR NV  Total  
 
P 37 17 8 0  62  
R
a
te
r
 T
w
o
 
N 0 13 0 0  13  
NTR 2 1 303 0  306  
NV 0 0 0 19  19  
 
     372    
 
Total 39 31 311 19  400  
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Where, N is the total number of signals in the sample, Pa equals the proportion 
of ratings in which two raters agree, and Pc equals the proportion of agreement 
between raters that occurred by chance.  The expected frequency of chance 
agreements can be calculated as:   
   ∑    
 
       (3) 
Where, Pef equals the product of the marginal proportions.  For the data in 
Table II, the classification by the two raters is presented.  Cohen’s Kappa, or κ, can 
vary from 1.00 (perfect agreement) to -1.00 (perfect chance).  A value of zero is equal 
to agreement that could be expected by chance and any value that is negative of the 
observed agreement is less than the chance agreement (Tinsley and Weiss, 2000).   
 
 
Referring to Table II, the expected frequencies for the number of agreements 
that would have been generated by chance are calculated along the diagonal rows, by 
multiplying the row total times the column total and then dividing by the overall total.  
For example, the Positive row total of 62 times the Positive column total of 39 divided 
by the total number of signals in the sample, 400, equals 6.05.  The result is the 
expected frequency.  The sum of these expected frequencies across the diagonal is 
used to calculate κ.  The percentage agreement between the two coders, adjusting for 
chance agreements, equals 79.29%.  Landis and Koch (1977: 165) provide a table for 
interpreting κ values, and those values are reproduced in Table III.  The 79.29% 
agreement between coders suggest that inter-rater agreement is “substantial”. 
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4.3.3 Presidential Signal Categories 
 
 
Using the software application, that tagged keywords and separated out 
paragraphs with those keywords for easy identification, signals are identified as 
Positive, Negative, Neutral, or No Value (Table IV) by examining a list of keywords, 
Economy, Deficit, Inflation, and Interest Rate (Table V)
10
.  Positive signals are 
defined as optimistic economic news, initiatives, proclamations, etc. that the market 
would react favorably signaled during a given day by the president for the first time. 
Negative signals are defined as new negative economic news, proclamations, 
sanctions, etc. that the market would react unfavorably, signaled during a given day 
by the president for the first time.  Two examples from Table IV illustrate positive 
and negative signals.  On July 5
th
, 1983, President Reagan gave a memo on the import 
relief in steel industry.  Not only is this information positive, but it was information 
confirmed by the president for the first time.   
                                                          
10
 Besides the Economy, Deficit, Inflation, and Interest Rates keywords mentioned earlier, other 
keywords that were believed to be significant because of their impacts on financial markets, were 
quickly dropped from the analysis.  Like Wood’s footnote (2004:576) other keywords were considered, 
such as “weakness”, “economic growth”, “economic conditions”, “unemployment”, “earnings”, 
“corporate earnings”, “commodities” “housing market”, “oil”, and “unemployment”, but these were 
dropped because those keywords were used too infrequently, not at all, or were quickly determined as 
not relevant to the analysis.  For example, the phrase “housing market” was uttered by President 
Reagan only nine times in eight years, President Bush did it 16 times in four years, particularly in 1992 
when he was running for re-election and trying to convince the American people that his economic 
programs were working.  Also, “bonds” was dropped because so many of the isolated words referred to 
bonds of friendship; “debt” was dropped because so many were “debts of gratitude”, “debt that can’t be 
repaid”; “bond market” – used too infrequently to make a difference, “corporate earnings” and 
“strength/weakness of the dollar”– not used by all presidents, and “earnings” - because there were very 
few references to financial earnings, but rather as personal earnings in terms of wages.   
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Table II 
 
Cohen’s Kappa 
 
κ can vary from 1.00 (perfect agreement) to -1.00 (perfect chance).  A value of zero is equal to 
agreement expected by chance and any value that is negative of the observed agreement is less than 
the chance agreement.  The expected frequencies for the number of agreements that would have been 
generated by chance are calculated along the diagonal rows from Table II, by multiplying the row 
total times the column total and then dividing by the overall total.  For example, in Table II, the P row 
total of 62 times the P column total of 39 divided by the total number of signals in the sample, 400, 
equals 6.05.  The result is the expected frequency.  The sum of these expected frequencies across the 
diagonal is used to calculate κ. 
 
 
  
Rater One 
   
  P N NTR NV  
R
a
te
r
 T
w
o
 
 
P 6.05 1 1 0  
N 0 1.01 0 0  
NTR 8 0 237.92 0  
 
NV 0 0 0 0.90  
 
    Pef 264.87 
       
       
Table III 
 
Agreement Strength for Signaling Data 
 
 
Kappa 
Statistic 
 
Strength of 
Agreement 
<0.00 
 
Poor 
0.00 - 0.20                                  
 
Slight 
0.21 – 0.40                                        
 
Fair 
0.41 – 0.60 
 
Moderate 
0.61 – 0.80  
 
Substantial 
0.81 – 1.00 
 
Nearly 
Perfect 
 
Frequencies provided by Landis and Koch (1977). 
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Table IV 
 
Example Paragraphs of Positive, Negative, Neutral and No Value Signals from 
Public Papers of President Reagan Using Software Application 
 
Each example reflects the application’s ability to search and find positive signals 
from President Reagan, for our keywords of interest, Economy, Deficit, Inflation, 
and Interest Rates  
Positive 
07/05/83: Pursuant to Section 202(b) (1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93 - 618), I 
have determined the action I will take with respect to the report of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (USITC), transmitted to me on May 6, concerning 
the results of its investigation, which was requested at my direction, on the merits of 
providing import relief to the specialty steel industry. I have determined that the 
granting of relief is consistent with our national economic interest and is 
necessitated by the pervasive nature of unfair trading practices in specialty steel. 
I will, therefore, proclaim import relief but in a modified form and duration from 
that recommended by the USITC. I will impose relief for four years rather than 
three, as recommended by the USITC, to provide time for the industry to complete 
important investment projects, improve productivity, and regain profitability. I have 
decided to provide relief in a form consistent with my belief in minimal government 
interference in the marketplace, and which will facilitate the orderly adjustment of 
the industry while recognizing the substantial differences in the competitive 
conditions of the various segments of the industry. 
 
Negative 
3/19/93:  This [health care crisis] is a devastating blow to our efforts to reduce the 
deficit. If you want us to bring the budget into balance, you must insist that after we 
pass this budget, we move on to find a way to bring health costs in line with 
inflation and provide a basic package of health care to all of our people.  By the end 
of the decade we'll be spending 20 percent of every dollar, 20 cents on the dollar, on 
health care. And none of our competitors will be over a dime, and we will be in a 
serious hole in terms of trying to be competitive. We also cannot balance the 
budget. 
 
Neutral 
10/6/99:  You look at what happens to these countries that try to hide their money; 
people still get it out. Interest rates are set in a global economy. If we get America 
out of debt, it means that all the Americans can borrow more cheaply. If the 
Government is out of debt, it means lower interest rates for businesses in this 
country, for home loans, for car loans, for college loans. It means more jobs and 
higher incomes.  
 
No Value 
12/17/96:  During the past 12 months, [the NATO-led Implementation Force] 
separated and ensured the demobilization of former warring factions. It provided 
the secure conditions in which democratic elections could be held and the 
reconstruction of Bosnia's shattered economy could begin. 
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President Clinton’s signal on March 13, 1993 is clearly negative, “This [health 
care crisis] is a devastating blow to our efforts to reduce the deficit.”  Since 
presidential signals are coded chronologically, this is the first time that President 
Clinton talked about an issue being devastating to the deficit, which at the time, the 
deficit was a major issue for the president.  Just the month previous, he had to renege 
on his promise of not taxing the middle class.    
 
Information that the president signals to the market for the first time is of 
interest in this study.  The president may say, “I’m very encouraged by some recent 
economic news that will come out later today.”  That is information that the president 
signals for the first time.  Investors might have speculated that there was good news 
the previous day or the previous week, but it was not confirmed until the president 
signaled it, as in the above example.  Each additional mention of his optimism about 
the economic news he signaled earlier in the day, either later that day or over the next 
few days, is now considered old information.  Those second and third signals are 
coded as Neutral.  
 
To be true to the concept of examining the president’s signals as an 
institutional investor would do, each signal has to be examined and coded 
chronologically, to discount those signals that the president repeats in stump speeches 
or on the campaign trail.  The Federal Reserve Chairman’s remarks typically create 
volatility (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005), but the Chairman only speaks in public a few 
times a year.   The president, on the other hand, speaks in public all the time, so a 
comment that he might make over and over again may not have the same impact as 
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does the Federal Reserve Chairman’s rare statements. For example, in March 1982, 
President Reagan made over 80 comments about the economy on 21 separate 
occasions, in just one month.  Therefore, while the president sends 5,764 signals to 
the market over the 18 year time period, the analysis produces 370 positive signals 
and 199 negative signals, against 4686 signals that are coded as neutral and 509 
signals that are coded as no value. From February 15, 1993 - when President Clinton 
announced that he was going to renege on his promise of a middle class tax cut and 
turn to the wealthiest Americans for more money to reduce the deficit - to August 10, 
1993 when his deficit reduction package was passed, President Clinton gave the same 
speech, or some variant of it for six months – mentioning the deficit 1,075 times11 (he 
would only mention the deficit 1,947 more times in the next 7.5 years) and how hard 
he was working on the problem.   
 
Presidents often repeat signals and rehash speeches about the economy, 
education, and social security, to name a few issues.  The research design assumes 
that if institutional investors pay attention to what the president says, then they pay 
attention to the first signal of new information the president makes about the 
economy, and less to the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, etc., because they will have made big chunk of 
their buying or selling decisions on the first signal, and less so for the ones the 
                                                          
11
 These numbers reflect every time the president uttered the word Deficit. 
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Table V 
Keyword Descriptions 
 
Keyword     Description 
 
Economy The total wealth and resources of the United States in terms of 
the             production and consumption of goods and services 
 
Deficit When government spending exceeds the receipts (tax revenue) 
it receives in a given year.  The total accumulation of these 
deficits is the national debt.  Governments finance deficits 
through the bond market 
 
Inflation An increase in the overall prices of goods and services in an 
economy and the inflation rate is the percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index – a measure of the overall cost of the 
goods and services bought by a typical consumer - from one 
period to the next, measured monthly. 
 
Interest Rates The supply of money into the system is under the partial control 
of the Federal Reserve System as it manipulates the federal 
funds rate through the open market operations. As interest rates 
increase, economic actors should borrow, consume, and invest 
less; as they decrease, economic actors should borrow, 
consume, and invest more. 
 
All definitions taken from (Mankiw, 2007) 
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president repeats ad nausea throughout the day.  This is particularly true for re-
election years when the president is trying to talk up his handling of the economy.  He 
may say something positive or negative at the beginning of the day, or at the 
beginning of the campaign.  That signal may create a market response, but the 
subsequent comments are assumed to be less significant and thus are coded as 
Neutral.   
 
For example, President Bush talked about how the economy was “starting to 
move” on May 19, 1992.  President Bush repeated this phrase on May 20, 21, 27, and 
28.  This methodology cuts down on the number of positive and negative N’s in the 
study, because if every time the president says “the economy is improving” was 
included in the analysis, this study would have an exponentially larger number of N’s.  
However, through the lens of an institutional investor, those actors that create the 
market volatility, the number of positive and negative comments actually diminish, 
because the president’s “starting to move” signal has already been factored into other 
information that they have already received.  When the president repeats the signal, 
this does not add to his decision-making process.   
 
The research presented here assumes that when certain words are analyzed out 
of context of the U.S. financial markets, there will be no effect and will be coded as a 
having No Value.  For example, President Reagan mentions on November 11, 1983 
that the Japanese “economy” will soon pass the Soviet Union’s to become the second 
largest on the planet, that signal is coded as having No Value.  Also, if the president is  
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referencing a historical fact
12
, that is coded that as No Value as well. 
Descriptive statistics on presidential signals are in Table VI and VII.  
 
 
4.3.4 Controlling for Macroeconomic Announcements 
 
 
Presidential signals are categorized as new if the president is talking about 
them for the first time. However, investors are also following official macroeconomic 
announcements and these announcement releases may coincide with the presidential 
signals that we are analyzing. In this regard, we need to control for a significant 
number of announcements in our study including Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
Producer Price Index (PPI), Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization (IPCU), 
New Residential Construction, Productivity and Costs, Gross Domestic Product  
                                                          
12
 For example, President George H.W. Bush, during his re-election campaign of 1992, mentioned over 
50 times that during the Carter administration, inflation was at 15% and interest rates were at 21%.  
Table VI 
Average Number of Signals per Year 
This table presents summary statistics of the average number of times President Reagan, Bush, 
and Clinton signaled to the market each year, using keywords Deficit, Economy, Inflation, and 
Interest Rates, from January 1981 to December 1999 
 
President Deficit Economy 
Inf&Int 
Rates 
    Reagan 61 115.5 108.25 
Bush 60.25 134.25 55.25 
Clinton 94.86 152.43 107.86 
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(GDP), Employment Situation (Unemp), Personal Income and Outlays (PI) and 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting dates. These are the major 
announcements that are employed in the literature investigating effects of 
macroeconomic news on the financial markets. The data for macroeconomic 
announcements is collected from the website of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
FOMC meeting dates are kindly provided by Gurkaynak et al. (2005). Table VIII 
reports release timing, the institution that makes the release and the frequency for the 
macroeconomic announcements that we include as controls. We control for the 
announcement effects by employing a dummy variable which takes one on the day of 
an announcement and zero otherwise.  
 
There is also evidence that news effects differ across business cycles. 
Investors may react to the same set of news differently in good and bad times 
(Blanchard , 1981; McQueen and Roley,1993).  For example Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2007) find that positive PPI and CPI shocks have significant 
Table VII 
 
Number of Positive and Negative Signals to the Market 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the number of times President Reagan, Bush, and 
Clinton sent a positive and negative signal to the market, using keywords Deficit, Economy, 
Inflation, and Interest Rates, from January 1981 to December 1999. 
 
President Deficit Economy Inf&Int Rates 
 
Pos Neg Ntrl Pos Neg Ntrl Pos Neg Ntrl 
Reagan 36 14 422 85 38 658 30 15 741 
Bush 10 8 196 70 52 340 20 13 139 
Clinton 42 7 599 53 53 887 24 8 704 
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effects on stock markets during expansion while the same inflationary shocks do not 
have a significant effect on stock markets during recession.  In this respect, investors 
may also react differently to presidential signals during expansions and recessions. 
Although our macroeconomic announcement day dummies may interact with the 
business cycle timing, we control for the business cycle effect with employing 
dummies for the recessions. The data for the chronology of business cycles are 
obtained from the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). We 
have only three recessions in our sample period. The first one starts January 1980 and 
lasts for six months. The second one starts July 1981 and lasts for 16 months. The 
final recession starts July 1990 and lasts eight months.  
 
4.4 Empirical Tests 
 
 
This study explores how the president’s rhetorical signals influence the stock 
market volatility of S&P 500 Composite Index. In order to capture the time varying 
nature of the conditional variance of returns of the indices, we use Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) modeling, proposed by 
Bollerslev(1986)
13
. Widely used GARCH processes use past unpredictable parts of 
returns, generally referred to as shocks, to predict the future volatility. A univariate 
GARCH (p,q) model can be written as: 
 
                                                          
13
 There are newer models like GARCH-X (Han and Kristensen, 2014). 
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where Rt  is the return on an asset at time t , εt  is the forecast error or shock, t  is the 
conditional variance of  Rt ,  , αi and βj   are the parameters, p and q refer to the number 
of lags of  shocks  and conditional variances respectively.  ̅ is the constant  long run 
Table VIII 
 
Control Variables 
 
This table reports release timing, the institution that makes the release and the frequency for the 
macroeconomic announcements. 
 
Announcement Source Frequency Timing 
   
Real Activity 
    Industrial Production  FRB Monthly On or around the 16th of the month 
Capacity Utilization FRB Monthly On or around the 16th of the month 
Employment Situation BLS Monthly The first Friday of the month 
Personal Income and Outlays BEA Monthly 4-5 weeks after month\'s end 
Productivity and Costs BLS Quarterly Apprx. 5 weeks after previous quarter\'s end 
GDP BEA Quarterly Three months after quarter ends 
      Prices 
     Consumer Price Index(CPI) BLS Monthly Last Tuesday of the month 
Producer Price Index(PPI) BLS Monthly Second or third week of the month 
      Forward Looking 
    New Residential Construction CB Monthly On or around the 17th of the month 
FOMC Meeting Minutes FRB Every six-week 
       
Recession  Start Duration   
 January1980 6 Months   
 July 1981 16 Months   
 July 1990 8 Months   
 
Abbreviations are Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis(BEA) and U.S. Census Bureau(CB). 
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volatility of the return process. 
 
GARCH models have many appealing characteristics. They manage to capture 
the volatility clustering phenomenon, which is an important empirical characteristic of 
asset distributions. Moreover the return distribution that evolves from a GARCH process 
has fatter tails than a normal distribution, which is again documented by many 
researchers starting with Fama (1965). They also have long run forecasting abilities, by 
capturing the concept of mean reversion with the help of a constant intercept term. 
 
Our analysis includes the following models. Model 1 employs dummies as 
exogenous variables in the variance equation of GARCH (1, 1) model for the Positive 
and Neutral signals that the president sends to the market; Model 2 includes dummies 
in the variance equation for the Negative and Neutral signals that the president sends 
to the market. In these two models positive and negative signal categories aggregate 
signals over each category. Model 3 employs separate dummies for positive and 
negative presidential signals on economy, deficit and inflation/interest rates. All three 
models include control variable dummies in the conditional variance of Equation 5. 
We also employ AR (1) term in the return series of Equation 5 to account for the 
empirically documented non-synchronous trading effects. Business cycles are 
represented by a binary variable with days in recession period taking one. We report 
only the dummy variables with statistically significant t-values.  
 
                   (5) 
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Results are summarized in Table IX. As suggested by a highly significant 
GARCH coefficient and sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients that is close to 
unity, all of our models are covariance stationary and the conditional variance exhibits 
a high level of persistence. The Ljung-Box test statistics based on squared residuals 
indicates that there are no serial correlations. We report coefficients and robust t- 
statistics calculated with the Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) method. 
 
President’s negative signals have an increasing effect on the volatility of the 
S&P 500 Index. Positive signals also increase volatility in the market as with any 
other information arrival but the effect is substantially less compared to the impact of 
negative news. This finding is in line with the well-known leverage effect in the 
literature and the arguments of Epstein and Schneider (2008). President’s Neutral 
statements, or reinforcements of prior information, decrease market volatility. These 
findings are intuitive considering that the president has the advantage of information 
asymmetry and when sending a signal to the markets, he does not have to negotiate 
with other political actors, like Congress, to be effective. Therefore investors change 
their positioning with respect to the presidential signals.  
 
In line with prior literature, we find that macroeconomic announcements such 
as Consumer Price Index, Producer Price Index, Industrial Production/Capacity 
Utilization, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Employment Situation, and Personal 
Income and Outlays create short term fluctuations in the markets. As a robustness  
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We performed analysis on the president’s positive, negative and neutral statements in 
regard to the separate specific categories of economy, deficit and inflation/interest rate  
check we conducted the regressions removing days when there is both a positive and  
negative signal and the results were similar. 
 
 
4.5 Post-hoc Analysis 
 
 
We performed analysis on the president’s positive, negative and neutral 
statements in regard to the separate specific categories of economy, deficit and 
inflation/interest rate on the volatility of the S&P 500 Index separately (see Tables 9 
and 10). Investors seem to respond predominantly to the signals on the state of the 
economy. Volatility increases the most when presidential rhetoric signals negative 
information about economy. When the president mentions already signaled news 
(coded as “neutral”) on economy, volatility decreases. When he repeatedly signals 
statements on inflation and interest (coded as “neutral”), volatility of S&P 500 
increases. These effects are significant after controlling for the macroeconomic 
announcements (Table IX: Model III) and after not controlling for the macroeconomic 
announcements (Table X).   
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Table IX 
GARCH (1, 1) Estimates for S&P 500 Index Returns on Presidential Signals 
and Controls 
 
This table presents results for the estimation of following GARCH models. 
Model 1 includes only the Positive and Neutral signals that the president sends to investors; Model 2 
includes only the Negative and Neutral signals that the president sends to the market; Model 3 
includes all the specific presidential signals. Macroeconomic announcements and business cycles 
enter the conditional variance equation as control dummies. We report only the variables with 
statistically significant t-values. Full tables are available upon request. The return series is the S&P 
500 Composite Index daily returns. Sample period is 1981 to 1999. We report the coefficients and 
robust t- statistics calculated with the Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) method. 
 
 
 
Model I Model II Model III 
 
Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Constant in Mean 0.0639 5.535 0.0655 5.708 0.0643 5.607 
AR(1) 0.0524 3.114 0.0519 3.081 0.0526 3.114 
Constant in Var. 0.0204 3.825 0.0197 3.776 0.0175 3.597 
ARCH(1) 0.0791 32.022 0.0797 32.271 0.0794 32.485 
GARCH(1) 0.9049 190.878 0.9046 193.942 0.9046 194.27 
All Positive 0.0287 2.038 
    All Negative 
  
0.0703 3.489 
  All Neutral -0.0140 -2.919 -0.0125 -2.871 
  Economy Neutral 
    
-0.0186 -3.036 
Economy Negative 
    
0.0821 3.502 
Inf/Int Neutral 
    
0.0153 2.252 
Controls       
Unemp 0.1190 4.498 0.1143 4.382 0.1223 4.594 
PPI 0.1153 4.16 0.0922 2.876 0.0902 2.733 
GDP -0.1312 -4.158 -0.1281 -4.097 -0.1263 -4.158 
Prod. Costs -0.0988 -3.557 -0.0874 -3.257 -0.0994 -3.477 
Recession 0.0154 3.031 0.0138 2.771 0.0137 2.7 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
Financial markets are influenced by marketplace information and our research 
explored presidential rhetoric in regard to financial market volatility.  We investigate 
this hypothesis by studying over 51,000 pages of presidential announcements over 
nearly 20 years of presidential signals about the deficit, economy and inflation/interest 
rates that were classified as positive, negative or neutral and their effect on the S&P 
500 Composite Index volatility.  Our research utilized GARCH modeling and suggest 
that negative signals increase volatility, positive signals also increase volatility but on 
             
  
         
       
  ∑   
 
   
        
Table X 
Post-Hoc Analysis-Without Macro-Economic Controls 
 
This table presents results for the estimation of following GARCH models. 
The return series is the S&P 500 Composite Index daily returns. Sample period is 1981 to 1999. We 
report the coefficients and robust t- statistics calculated with the Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) 
method. 
 
 
 
Neutral Negative Positive 
 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Economy -0.0143 -2.087 0.1220 6.087 -0.0221 -1.089 
Infl./Interest 0.0143 2.058 0.0179 0.486 0.0185 0.570 
Deficit -0.0120 -1.482 0.0026 0.047 -0.0079 -0.281 
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a substantially less scale, and neutral statements slightly decrease market volatility.  
Ambiguity-averse investors are more likely to react to negative signals more strongly 
than positive signals in line with previous research (Epstein and Schneider, 2008).   
 
Presidential rhetoric is an important research area as presidents are 
continuously making announcements and research suggests that news from a reliable 
source will lead to more portfolio rebalancing. Illeditsch (2011) argues that when 
investors receive information that is difficult to process, investors’ desire to hedge 
ambiguity leads to excess volatility. We argue that presidential rhetoric is an 
important and reliable source of information and affects market place volatility with 
negative and positive presidential signals leading to higher volatility. The result that a 
neutral signal from the president reduces market volatility would suggest that this type 
of information reassures investors that there is nothing to add to their already acquired 
market information. 
 
Our empirical findings indicate that information from a reliable source, in this 
case the president, does affect market volatility.  Our research suggests that 
institutions and other financial participants involved in the stock market should take 
heed of presidential announcements and the resulting market volatility.  Financial 
participants have access to a large amount of data and information daily and 
presidential announcements confirm, heighten or contradict their privately held 
information with resultant heightened or lessoned volatility.  As the reputation of the 
president is of importance, the quality of presidential rhetoric should be very high.  As 
there are many stages whereby different information is expunged on its way to the 
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president, only the key information is elicited by the president to the populace, thus 
enhancing its value.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to determine the factors that affect variability in slope of 
implied volatility skew of S&P 500 index options and VIX. We examine a range of 
microstructure variables including the level of order flow toxicity in the market using 
VPIN metric. Results document a statistically significant relation between slope and 
order flow toxicity even after controlling for liquidity, volatility and momentum 
effects, transaction costs and net buying pressure. In this respect, option pricing 
models may benefit from incorporating a measure of market makers’ adverse 
selection risk.  
 
The thesis further analyzes changes in VIX and stock market volatility in 
response to announcements. Results show a statistically significant relation between 
VIX and macroeconomic announcements even after controlling for liquidity, volatility 
and momentum effects.  Stock market volatility responds to presidential rhetoric 
besides macroeconomic announcements.  These imply that portfolio managers do pay 
attention to macroeconomic announcements and presidential rhetoric.  
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